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This thesis includes a literature review that is an examination of nationalism and patriotism as 
psychological constructs as well as an analysis of two post-World War II domains of nationalism 
in Germany. In the psychological literature, there is a very important distinction to be made 
between the concepts of nationalism and patriotism. As nationalism and patriotism remain 
relevant areas of study by scholars due to more global citizens than ever before, it is vital to 
understand the distinction between the two. The goal of the literature review is to demonstrate 
how nationalism and patriotism differ substantially, how patriotism also takes on various forms, 
how major determinants such as socialization contribute to nationalism, how certain brain 
structures function with each construct, how these concepts change over time, and how both 
relate to the degradation of outgroups in very different ways. By clarifying factors that are 
significantly related to nationalism such as socialization and degradation of outgroups, the 
analysis of two post-World War II domains of nationalism in Germany builds upon this 
psychological foundation by considering how fairy tale films and soccer both foster and display 
nationalism. Using films, the goal of the analysis is to argue that nationalistic themes are 
depicted in fairy tales films and the game of soccer. The various facets include for the fairy tales, 
superiority over other countries and anti-capitalism, and for soccer, the intense emotional 
identification and the us versus them dynamic of exclusion. This thesis contends how 
nationalism is not a thing of a past; it is still present today. 
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“Don’t Confuse Patriotism with Nationalism”: A Literature Review and An Analysis of 
Two Domains of Post-WWII Nationalism in Germany 
Many countries are becoming increasingly aware of crimes occurring that appear to be 
linked to nationalism. For instance, in Germany, the country that will be analyzed in this thesis, a 
Google search of “nationalism crimes germany” brings up roughly eight million results that 
include recent stories discussing right-wing terror, a far-right problem, and its severity. The same 
Google search also creates results that explain Germany’s past of nationalism, which is a long, 
turbulent history. One Google search shows how nationalism can be assessed both in the past as 
well as modern day. 
This presents first, the question of what differences lie between patriotism and 
nationalism because the two concepts both involve having pride for one’s country but when does 
the national pride go too far? The distinction between patriotism and nationalism is important to 
clarify since the outcomes related to each concept differ greatly. By knowing the specific 
differences in their relationships to other concepts such as the determinants that contribute to 
nationalism and the degradation of outgroups, science can guide society towards not only a better 
understanding of national identities but better prevention of violence and hate toward outgroups 
by using the information about the determinants. 
Hence, the following thesis will begin with a literature review that investigates this 
distinction between nationalism and patriotism with five separate psychological studies that each 
clarify the differences in their own way. Starting with an evaluation of different types of 
patriotism by Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999), the literature review then moves onto Dekker, 
Malov​á, and Hoogendoorn (2003) analyzing the determinants of nationalism among other  
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relationships. This is followed by a study from Takeuchi et al. (2016) that investigates the brain 
correlations of gray matter density for both patriotism and nationalism. Then comes Davidov’s 
(2011) study that assesses the stability of these concepts over time in numerous countries and 
Blank and Schmidt (2003) specifically explore the relationships in Germany between 
nationalism and patriotism and the degradation of outgroups. 
Following this literature review, the next major section of the thesis is an analysis of two 
domains of post-World War II nationalism in Germany. The purpose of this section differs from 
the literature review’s purpose of clarifying the distinction between patriotism and nationalism 
by focusing on Germany’s displays of nationalism. This was intentional due to the positive 
relationship found by Blank and Schmidt (2003) between nationalism and the degradation of 
outgroups as well as anti-Semitism and the information from the Human Rights Watch’s (2021) 
“World Report 2021: Germany” that states “crimes committed based on far-right and antisemitic 
ideology remain a serious concern” (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Both the results from Blank 
and Schmidt (2003) and the information from the Human Rights Watch (2021) indicate the 
importance behind investigating domains where nationalism is being displayed and fostered, 
especially as national socialization was shown to be a major contributor to nationalism by 
Dekker et al. (2003). 
The two domains that are analyzed include fairy tale films or “Märchenfilme” and soccer 
or “Fußball.” Both domains are evaluated using films since the film medium can have a powerful 
influence on its viewers (Blessing, 2010, p. 234). For the fairy tale films, “Das 
Zaubermännchen” (Engel, 1960) and “Wie heiratet man einen König” (Simon, 1969) are 
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analzyed, whereas soccer is investigated with a historical fiction film, “Das Wunder von Bern” 
(Wortmann, 2003), and a documentary, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” (Wortmann, 2006). 
  
“Don’t Confuse Patriotism with Nationalism”: A Literature Review 
Many researchers over the past 25 years have focused on finding the distinction between 
patriotism and nationalism to create a definition for these terms. This has caused the literature to 
have numerous interpretations as to where the boundary between nationalism and patriotism 
should lie exactly. Shedding light on the distinction between nationalism and patriotism as well 
as understanding national identities as a whole more clearly is becoming increasingly important 
in society today as the world currently has what is estimated as 80 million people displaced from 
their home of origin due to the ‘Refugee Crisis’ (International Rescue Committee, n.d.). This 
article seeks to not only clarify the distinction between nationalism and patriotism but also to 
discover how possible factors such as socialization, brain structures, the stability over time, and 
the degradation of outgroups may influence these psychological constructs in an individual.  
The Various Differences Between Nationalism and Patriotism 
Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999) sought out to evaluate patriotism in the forms of blind 
and constructive patriotism to investigate their relationships to nationalism. Schatz et al. (1999) 
defined blind patriotism as “a rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by 
unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism” while 
constructive patriotism pertained to “an attachment to country characterized by ‘critical loyalty,’ 
questioning and criticism of current group practices” (p. 153). The definition of nationalism in 
this study involved one thinking their nation is superior when compared to others and having an  
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orientation that leans toward national dominance. To give a brief overview of this section, 
through two separate studies using self-report surveys, Schatz et al. (1999) found that blind 
patriotism had a stronger relationship with national attachment and a strong correlation to 
right-wing authoritarianism. They also uncovered that blind patriotism was positively related to a 
preference for symbolic behaviors (e.g., the flag), political conservatism, cultural contamination, 
pro-U.S information, and nationalism, and negatively related to constructive patriotism and 
political efficacy (Schatz et al., 1999). 
Two studies were conducted in the United States using exploratory factor analysis in the 
first study and confirmatory factor analysis to validate and replicate the findings in the second 
study. The studies hypothesized first, that “although both blind and constructive patriotism 
would be positively related to degree of national identification and attachment, they would 
exhibit differential relations with the cognitive and behavioral criteria” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 
155). Second, another hypothesis was that constructive patriotism and political efficacy, 
knowledge, information gathering, and activism would all be positively associated with one 
another. However, the third hypothesis expected blind patriotism to be negatively associated with 
these same variables. Moreover, Schatz et al. (1999) anticipated in the fourth hypothesis that 
“blind but not constructive patriotism would be positively associated with nationalism and with 
perceived threats to national security (national vulnerability) and national culture (cultural 
contamination)” (p. 156). Along with this, the fifth hypothesis expected that blind but not 
constructive patriotism would be positively correlated with conservatism. All of these five 
hypotheses were tested in both studies, but the second study by Schatz et al. (1999) assessed two 
additional hypotheses. These were that sixth, blind patriotism and a preference for symbolic 
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(e.g., the flag, the colors) instead of instrumental behaviors would be positively related and 
seventh, that “individuals with high scores for blind patriotism would show a preference for 
pro-U.S. over anti-U.S. information” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 164).  
To test all of the hypotheses except the last two listed, the first study by Schatz et al. 
(1999) had 291 undergraduate students from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst 
participate for extra credit. 164 were female and 127 were male. The mean age of the participants 
was 20.35 and 86.9 percent of them identified as Caucasian, which displays the limitation of a 
non-representative sample. Others identified as Asian or Pacific Islander (3.8 percent), African 
American (2.7 percent), Hispanic (2.1 percent), American Indian (1.4 percent), and other (3.1 
percent). 
A self-report survey was administered to all participants. Schatz et al. (1999) measured 
blind and constructive patriotism using 19 items and national attachment using 17 items 
surrounding “positive identification with and feelings of affective attachment to country” (p. 
156). Scores of national attachment were unit weighted and summed. Six items pertained to 
nationalism on the survey. Then, three items were asked for cultural contamination and another 
three items for political efficacy. For example, one statement that people rated on a scale from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree involved how the adoption of foreign culture practices would 
“trouble me because it might change or water down American culture too much” (Schatz et al., 
1999, p. 157). As for political efficacy, the statements measured dealt with people’s perceived 
power and ability to alter political policies. National vulnerability was also measured in 
participants using ten items about the United States and their belief that it is “vulnerable to 
foreign aggression and must constantly be on guard” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 157). A political 
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knowledge quiz was in the survey as well with six items previously used by other researchers in 
this field. Political information gathering and activism were assessed by asking participants to 
estimate the number of hours per week that they engage in political information and activism 
behaviors. Lastly, their political ideology was also recorded through self-ratings. 
Using a constrained two-factor exploratory factor analysis, results from the first study by 
Schatz et al. (1999) found that “blind and constructive patriotism represent distinct constructs,” 
meaning that there was support for the first hypothesis in that both concepts exhibit differential 
relations with the cognitive and behavioral criteria. Moreover, findings showed that although 
both blind and constructive patriotism were positively associated with national attachment 
scores, they are expressed in different ways by participants. Along with this, Schatz et al. (1999) 
discovered that “the relationship between blind patriotism and national attachment was 
significantly stronger than the relationship between constructive patriotism and national 
attachment” (p. 160). This indicates that the terms share a core patriotic sentiment but each differ 
in how the sentiment affects an individual’s cognitions and behaviors.  
Another finding was that blind patriotism and political conservatism were positively 
related to one another, which was in support of the fifth hypothesis. The second hypothesis that 
constructive patriotism and political efficacy, knowledge, information gathering, and activism 
would be positively related, and blind patriotism would be negatively related to these variables 
was also supported by the findings. Political efficacy and political information gathering were 
found to be significant positive predictors for constructive patriotism. On the other hand, cultural 
contamination was a significant negative predictor for constructive patriotism but a significant 
positive predictor, along with nationalism and national vulnerability, for blind patriotism. These 
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findings are consistent with the findings in the next study that involve right-wing 
authoritarianism and blind patriotism. Support was provided to all of the proposed hypotheses 
from Schatz et al. (1999) that were analyzed in this first study.  
A second study was conducted by Schatz et al. (1999) to replicate and validate the 
findings of the first study as well as examine both types of patriotism in the context of symbolic 
behaviors and right-wing authoritarianism. 253 undergraduate students in psychology classes at 
Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi and Northern Illinois University participated in the study. 
199 were female and 53 were male along with one person in the study who did not specify their 
sex. The large majority of the participants (60.9 percent) were European American. The study 
was completed in large groups by participants from Northern Illinois University and at home by 
participants from Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi. 
A self-report survey was administered to collect data. Most of the variables were 
measured identically to how they were in the first study. Schatz et al. (1999) assessed the new 
variable of symbolic versus instrumental behaviors using 14 choice items involving one option 
that represented a symbolic behavior and the other an instrumental behavior. An example of a 
choice item for a symbolic behavior was that “children should learn to say the Pledge of 
Allegiance in school” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 165). As for instrumental behavior, one particular 
choice item discussed how “children should learn about our system of government in school” 
(Schatz et al., 1999, p. 165). A different measurement of eight items was used for political 
knowledge than in the first study by Schatz et al. (1999) since they expanded the constraints of 
the variable to include their interest and behavior as well as their knowledge. The participants 
had their information-processing preference analyzed through four pro-U.S., four anti-U.S., and 
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         11 
two neutral article titles that were presented to participants. After being presented with the article 
titles, Schatz et al. (1999) asked participants to place an X by the article title that they would be 
most interested in reading. By the end, all titles were rank-ordered by participants and given an 
interest rating ranging from definitely would not like to read this article at one to definitely 
would like to read this article at seven. The last new measurement added to this study was a 
right-wing authoritarianism scale by Altemeyer (1998) as cited in Schatz et al. (1999) (p. 166). 
Results of the second study replicated and validated the findings of the first study by 
Schatz et al. (1999). Blind patriotism was positively associated with the conservative political 
ideology and the American Republican political party identification. Furthermore, the 
relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and blind patriotism was strongly correlated. In 
contrast, constructive patriotism was not associated with either right-wing authoritarianism or 
conservative political ideology. Support was found for the sixth hypothesis involving symbolic 
versus instrumental behaviors. This sixth hypothesis that blind patriotism and a preference for 
symbolic (e.g., the flag, the colors) instead of instrumental behaviors would be positively related 
was uncovered in that blind patriotism “was positively associated with the belief that symbolic 
behaviors were more important to the country than instrumental behaviors” (Schatz et al., 1999, 
p. 167). Schatz et al. (1999) also discovered that “individuals with high blind patriotism scores 
concern themselves with abstract aspects of development and attachment to their country” (p. 
167). There was no association found between constructive patriotism and either symbolic or 
instrumental pro-U.S. behaviors. 
However, a relationship was discovered between constructive patriotism and political 
knowledge, interest, and behavior that Schatz et al. (1999) predicted. Despite both types of 
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patriotism showing an increased interest in politics, Schatz et al. (1999) found that “only 
constructive patriotism was positively associated with greater knowledge about politics and more 
frequent politically relevant behavior” (p. 168). Furthermore, the study indicated that blind 
patriotism is related to an increased preference for pro-U.S. information. Hence, the lower the 
blind patriotism score, the weaker the preference for “exposure to information that glorifies 
rather than criticizes the country” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 168). Overall, the differences between 
constructive and blind patriots found by Schatz et al.’s (1999) second study indicated that blind 
patriots are more likely to identify with the American republican political party and a 
conservative ideology, be linked to right-wing authoritarianism, prefer symbolic behaviors as 
well as praise in articles about their country, be less knowledgeable about politics, and engage in 
political behaviors less frequently.  
One similarity between the two studies conducted by Schatz et al. (1999) was the 
population sample. Although several universities from across the United States were utilized, all 
participants in both studies were undergraduate students. Moreover, the majority of students in 
both studies were Caucasian. The data collection method for both studies was also the same since 
both studies used a self-report survey. Moreover, despite having two more additional hypotheses 
and three additional variables tested in the second study, relatively similar hypotheses and 
variables were examined. Lastly, both studies used a type of factor analysis. Differences were 
also present between the studies conducted by Schatz et al. (1999) in that nationalism was looked 
at as a variable in the first study more so than it was in the second study. Similarly, although the 
second study replicated and validated the findings of the first, it investigated symbolic versus 
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instrumental behaviors, more facets of political knowledge, and right-wing authoritarianism, 
which were not assessed in the first study. 
By combining the information from the two studies, the findings are more attractive 
because the second study used confirmatory factor analysis that validated the findings of the first 
study, which used an exploratory factor analysis. This replication of the findings in a second 
study makes the findings more reliable as a whole, even despite the many limitations of the 
studies that include only having undergraduate students in the sample, a largely Caucasian 
sample, and only taking place within one country. The discovery that there is an empirical 
distinction between blind patriotism and constructive patriotism is now backed by two 
consecutive studies as well as the finding that blind patriotism predicts increased nationalism. 
These results enhance the literature’s understanding of the relationship between patriotism and 
nationalism. This is notable since this Schatz et al. (1999) study has set a precedent for many 
other studies to come such as Dekker, Malov​á, and Hoogendoorn (2003).  
The Determinants of Nationalism 
Similar to how Schatz et al. (1999) strived to evaluate patriotism, Dekker et al. ​(2003) 
studied nationalism to present a clear, consistent terminology for the term and to identify its main 
determinants using three empirical studies in different states to provide various contexts. ​To give 
a brief overview of what is to come in this section, Dekker et al.​ (2003) conducted three studies 
in three separate countries to analyze nationalism in terms of what factors determine it, finding 
that there is empirical evidence for a hierarchy involving national attitudes. Dekker et al. (2003) 
also discovered that auto-stereotypes had the most effect on national attitude by being a positive 
predictor for it along with a few other factors including national emotions and attitude toward 
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outgroups. Evidence was also gathered, showing that the highest stage of nationalism is separate 
from the proposed and supported hierarchy. 
Dekker et al. (2003) tested seven hypotheses that will be reviewed here. First, they 
hypothesized that there are one neutral (national feeling) and five positive attitudes (national 
liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism). Second, a 
prediction was made that these national attitudes reside in a cumulative hierarchy from national 
feeling to liking to pride to preference to superiority to nationalism. Third, the hypothesis by 
Dekker et al. (2003) expected that if no positive national attitudes were present, then negative 
national attitudes such as national alienation, national shame, national disgust, and national hate 
would be found instead. Fourth, the hypothesis was that a distinction can be made between 
several different positive or negative “regional-national” attitudes while the fifth hypothesis 
involved international attitudes and predicted that these attitudes can be distinguished by 
“particular regions of the globe, its people, the world, and humankind” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 
348). The sixth hypothesis was that individuals are likely to “combine moderate positive 
attitudes on one level with positive attitudes on another level” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 348). 
Lastly, the seventh hypothesis by Dekker et al. (2003) also predicted a nationalism explanatory 
hypothesis, in that when an individual has developed nationalism, it can be explained by all of 
the following variables: 
intense positive national emotions that were previously experienced; national behaviors 
with a high intensity that were previously performed; extremely positive beliefs about 
one’s country and people; highly negative attitudes toward national or ‘ethnic’ minorities 
living within the country, and other foreign countries and people; a strong concern about 
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one’s (family’s) political, economic, social, and cultural future; and a very low sense of 
positive self-identity (p. 353). 
All of these hypothesized variables that explain a person’s nationalism are then influenced by 
aspects of a person’s national socialization, such as “the frequency and intensity of national 
rituals as well as national (or nationalistic) education, information, and/or persuasion from 
various socializers” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 353). 
To test the first two hypotheses proposed, the first study in the Netherlands by Dekker et 
al. (2003) was conducted on 849 secondary school students, ages 15 to 18, with Dutch 
nationalities that were invited to participate in the study through their schools. There was no 
clarification in the study regarding how the participants obtained their Dutch nationalities. 
Although Dekker et al. (2003) included all school types and denominations in the data sampling, 
“students from Catholic and Protestant Christian schools and middle general-education schools 
were slightly overrepresented” in comparison to students from other schools such as 
non-confessional public schools (p. 354). An anonymous self-report survey that lasted 50 
minutes was administered to collect data during school hours. All classes were included except 
for history/constitution and society classes to limit potentially biased responses towards being 
more socially desirable. The survey measured national attitudes (national feeling, national liking, 
national preference, national superiority, nationalism, national alienation, national shame, 
national disgust, and national hate) with 14 statements. 
Correlation coefficients were computed with 567 participant scores. Using a Mokken 
scale analysis, results indicated that “with the exception of the liking-preference correlation, the 
correlations between the different attitudes at the shortest distance were higher than those 
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between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 
356). Hence, the first and second hypothesis tested in the first study were supported. Distinctions 
could be made so the first hypothesis was supported, but the second hypothesis was only 
partially supported since the liking-preference correlation was not high. 
To assess nationalism in another type of state, another study was completed in Slovakia, a 
newly-formed independent country. In this second study, Dekker et al. (2003) investigated the 
first and second hypotheses as well as the seventh hypothesis regarding nationalism and its 
development. Students from the Political Science Department of Comenius University conducted 
interviews with 635 participants in their homes to gather data. The sample was not representative 
of the Slovakian population since half of the participants were ages 14 to 20 and fewer men than 
women were interviewed. However, this was due to the major obstacle that Dekker et al. (2003) 
faced regarding the Slovak Ministry of Education forbidding them from collecting data in 
secondary school classes.​ A self-report survey similar to the first study on national attitudes was 
used. Twenty-six items involving Slovak national emotions, national auto-clichés, 
auto-stereotypes, national behaviors, negative attitude toward outgroups, concern about one’s 
future, sense of positive self-identity, and national socialization were measured. 
Using multiple regression analysis, Dekker et al. (2003) discovered that “national 
emotion had the most effect on national attitude” with national auto-stereotypes, attitude toward 
outgroups, and positive attitude toward nationalistic leaders, described as charismatic leaders 
who have concentrated on national education and communication, following closely behind (p. 
358). Results indicated support for the first and second hypotheses that positive national attitudes 
can be distinguished empirically and that these positive attitudes do form the proposed 
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cumulative hierarchy. Moreover, the seventh hypothesis on explaining the determinants of 
nationalism was supported partially since auto-clichés, previously performed national behaviors, 
concern about the future, and sense of positive self-identity were not strong predictors for a 
person’s positive national attitude in the way that national emotions, auto-stereotypes, attitude 
toward outgroups, and national socialization were. 
To test these conclusions from this study in an additional type of state, Dekker et al. 
(2003) conducted another study in Basque Country in northern Spain. In the third study, all 
seven proposed hypotheses were tested by Dekker et al. (2003). The sample was 774 secondary 
school students ages 14 to 18 who were contacted through their schools. Twenty-five schools 
“were selected on the basis of school type: private or public school, linguistic model of the 
school, and the geographic location” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 358). Data was collected through a 
self-report survey that was administered to all participants with 37 positives and eight negative 
Basque regional-national items. Results exhibited support for the second hypothesis of a 
hierarchy, but unlike what was predicted, the attitude of regional-national liking was more 
common among participants than the attitude of regional-national feeling. Dekker et al. (2003) 
believed this was likely the effect of there being no independent Basque country, since Basque 
country is located in Spain, speaks its own Basque language, and desires to secede from Spain. 
Consequently, high correlations were discovered between all of the individual attitude subscales, 
except for with preference and superiority, but especially between nationalism and the neutral 
attitude of regional feeling. A Mokken scale analysis showed the trend that despite the exception 
of preference and feeling/nationalism, “correlations between attitudes at the shortest distance 
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were higher than those between attitudes at a larger distance” in the proposed hierarchy (Dekker 
et al., 2003, p. 359). 
Along with this, respondents’ answers to 25 items regarding Spain provided evidence 
against Dekker et al.'s (2003) predictions that participants were more likely to have the attitude 
of national liking than national feeling, despite two nationalism items that provided support for 
the hypothesis. The most important finding was that the nationalistic attitude had high 
correlations with several attitudes such as feeling, liking, and pride that are lower in the 
cumulative hierarchy. Dekker et al. (2003) believed “the high levels of support for three of the 
nationalistic items (Spanish blood, common origin, part of one Spanish family)” were the reason 
behind this finding (p. 361). 
With a Mokken scale analysis program, Dekker et al. (2003) concluded that since the data 
gave evidence for the proposed hierarchy regarding national feeling, liking, pride, preference, 
and superiority but not nationalism, the highest stage of nationalism is separate from this 
hierarchy and should be treated as being its’ own phenomenon. Support was found for the first 
hypothesis since Basque youth were able to be categorized into five different groups based on 
their attitudes. Results also displayed support for the sixth hypothesis that individuals would 
combine regional-national attitudes with positive national attitudes. However, there was no 
substantial support for the expectation that “very positive or extremely positive regional-national 
attitudes exclude such positive national attitudes” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 363). Since “the 
numbers of respondents with negative Spanish attitudes tended to increase as their positive 
Basque attitudes increased,” Dekker et al. (2003) found support for their hypothesis that negative 
national attitudes and very positive regional-national attitudes are combined by individuals (p. 
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363). It is important to note here that due to the specific context of Basque country, these 
findings will likely not generalize very broadly.  
As for the seventh hypothesis, a backward regression analysis was completed. The 
analysis included the explanatory variables of “attitudes toward Spain (national liking, national 
shame, and nationalism), the value of maintenance of Basque culture, the auto-cliché of increase 
in political liberties, and the socialization variables of reading newspapers and having heard 
nationalistic statement” (Dekker et al, 2003, p. 363). Dekker et al. (2003) found that these factors 
accounted for 64 percent of the total explained variable in the attitude of Basque nationalism, 
showcasing that all four of the explanatory variables analyzed are key determinants for 
nationalism.  
Similarities between all of these studies conducted by Dekker et al. (2003) were the 
method of data collection and the lack of a representative data sample. Each study utilized a 
self-report to measure variables and gather data to analyze. Furthermore, the limitation of each 
study was the population sample since they all involved a very specific group of people, which 
could make the results less generalizable. Differences were also apparent in that each study 
gathered data in a different state (the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Basque country) and the second 
study was not conducted with the same population sample as the other two (secondary school 
students). These differences are important to consider because having different populations 
studied in different states may make the findings less generalizable. Additionally, the first study 
examined only the first two hypotheses, whereas the two other following studies investigated the 
nationalism explanatory hypothesis among others. The third study had substantially more 
hypotheses that were tested than the other two studies by Dekker et al. (2003). Each study used a 
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variety of different data regression techniques such as Mokken scale analysis, multiple 
regression analysis, and more to find results. There was not one signal method of regression that 
was completed in each of the three separate studies. However, the first and third study both used 
Mokken scale analysis as well as Pearson’s correlation coefficients. 
By combining the information from all three of these studies, the findings are more 
attractive since the results show that there is significant support across different types of 
government states and historical backgrounds for being able to distinguish between national 
attitudes and having a cumulative hierarchy ranging from national feeling to liking to pride to 
preference to superiority. However, the lack of support for nationalism in this hierarchy and the 
conclusion by Dekker et al. (2003) in the third study that nationalism is a separate phenomenon 
itself indicate the severity of variables that contribute to the development of nationalism. As a 
result, the findings regarding the seventh hypothesis in the second and third study indicate that 
national emotions, auto-stereotypes, attitude toward outgroups, and national socialization all 
contribute to the attitude development of nationalism in individuals. This was displayed through 
the 64 percent of this variance that was determined by these same concepts of national emotions 
(national liking, national shame, and nationalism), the maintenance value of Basque culture 
(auto-stereotypes), the auto-cliché of political liberties (attitude toward outgroups), and 
socialization through hearing nationalistic statements as well as reading newspapers (national 
socialization). 
The findings in the Dekker et al. (2003) study are in agreement with the literature as a 
whole on nationalism and patriotism. It expands upon the investigation that was conducted by 
Schatz et al. (1999). While Schatz et al. (1999) analyzed constructive patriotism, blind 
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patriotism, and nationalism, this study by Dekker et al. (2003) went further to distinguish six 
national attitudes that correspond with the three concepts. Constructive patriotism appears to be 
related to national feeling, liking, and pride. Blind patriotism is associated with national 
preference and nationalism corresponds to national superiority and nationalism. 
The Brain Associations with Nationalism and Patriotism 
As these associations have been solidified and technology has progressed further, 
researchers such as Takeuchi et al. (2016) are proposing new lines of research with questions that 
seek to discover how patriotism and nationalism function within the brains of individuals. 
Takeuchi et al. (2016) studied nationalism and patriotism in the brain using differences in gray 
matter structure. The purpose was to be the first study to assess nationalism and patriotism in 
terms of their associated brain structures to further the literature’s understanding of these 
phenomena. To explain briefly what is to come in this section, Takeuchi et al. (2016) assessed 
the brain in-depth to discover differences in gray matter for nationalism and patriotism. For 
nationalism, Takeuchi et al. (2016) found that individuals with higher nationalism scores show a 
greater gray matter density (rGMD) in their posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) as well as their 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), which for the PCC is similar to what the brain scans displayed for 
individuals with low compassion and for the OFC is similar to the images of those who had 
higher feelings of superiority over others. As for patriotism, the major findings were that 
individuals with higher quality of life (QOL) displayed higher patriotism and that individuals 
with high patriotism scores show less rGMD in their rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC).  
Takeuchi et al. (2016) hypothesized that individual nationalism would be associated with 
differences in the social-related areas and limbic neural mechanisms of the brain such as the 
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amygdala while individual patriotism would be associated with areas of the brain such as the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that are relevant to a person’s well-being. The study by 
Takeuchi et al. (2016) included 777 participants with 433 men and 344 women and an average 
age of 20.7 years. All of the participants were right-handed and either in university, college, 
postgraduate studies, or one year removed from these institutions. The participants were invited 
to partake in this study “as part of an ongoing project investigating associations among brain 
imaging, cognitive functions, aging, genetic, and daily habits” (p. 2). 
As studies that conduct an exploratory whole-brain search typically have a very low 
statistical power, a whole-brain analysis was conducted on participants to test this hypothesis 
using a neuroimaging technique called voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to assess the regional 
gray matter (GM) density (rGMD). Along with this neuroimaging technique, Takeuchi et al. 
(2016) utilized a National Identity Scale with a five-point Likert scale to measure nationalism 
and patriotism. Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrix was also used to measure intelligence and 
“adjust for the effect of general intelligence on brain structures” to ensure a credible analysis 
(Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 3). Several additional questionnaires such as the Temperament 
Character Inventory, Beck Depression Inventory, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, the 
Quality of Life (QOL) measure, and the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory were also 
administered to assess various factors respectively like cooperativeness, depression, sense of 
superiority, positive feelings, and aggressiveness. Data was collected from the MRI by taking 
“high-resolution T1-weighted structural images” and pre-processed using Statistical Parametric 
Mapping software (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 3).  
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         23 
Using multiple regression analysis, Takeuchi et al. (2016) found that significantly higher 
nationalism scores were given by males whereas sex had no association with patriotism. Results 
indicated that “the nationalism score was significantly and positively correlated with the feelings 
of superiority score and trait anger score and was significantly and negatively correlated with the 
cooperativeness score” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 4). For patriotism, a significant, positive 
correlation with the average QOL, assessing positive feelings, was found as well as a weak but 
significant, positive correlation with the social acceptance vs. social intolerance score. Both 
patriotism and nationalism had no relationship with negative emotions such as depression or 
suicidal ideation. 
Takeuchi et al. (2016) discovered partial support for the proposed hypothesis involving 
nationalism in that “participants with a greater sense of nationalism showed greater rGMD in 
areas of [posterior cingulate cortex] PCC and [orbitofrontal cortex] OFC and the smaller rGMD 
of the area in the right amygdala” ( p. 7). To simplify, this finding suggested that high 
nationalism scorers display greater rGMD in their PCC, which is similar to the displays of low 
compassion in this area. Hence, those with low compassion and higher nationalism had greater 
rGMD in a particular area of their PCC, leading to the display of the “psychological 
characteristics of nationalists including their lack of compassion, e.g., … intolerance to 
minorities, xenophobia, and ethnic violence” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p.7). Moreover, participants 
with high nationalism scores also had greater rGMD in their OFC, which was similar to the 
images of the OFC in participants with higher feelings of superiority over others. This finding 
suggested that those with higher feelings of superiority over others and higher nationalism had 
greater rGMD in this area of their OFC, which is in agreement with “the definition of 
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nationalism (a positive evaluation of one’s own group, which is inherently related to the 
derogation of others)” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 8). 
Along with the greater rGMD displays in the PCC and OFC of those with high 
nationalism, Takeuchi et al. (2016) found an association in the amygdala but this time, with 
smaller rGMD. Since participants with smaller rGMD in their amygdala had higher suicide 
ideation scores and participants with higher nationalism displayed similar small rGMD in this 
area, Takeuchi et al. (2016) stated that “subjects with higher nationalism may have neural 
mechanisms that overlap with those of subjects with suicide ideation” (p. 8). Furthermore, 
despite having no association with an rGMD cluster of any size, individuals with higher 
nationalism expressed more anger traits. In summary, evidence was uncovered that shows there 
are distinct differences between the brains of nationalists and patriots. 
As for the proposed hypothesis on patriotism, Takeuchi et al. (2016) found full support. 
Results showed a significant negative correlation between patriotism score and the rGMD in the 
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC). To further explain, this means that “participants with 
higher patriotism have smaller rGMD in RLPFC, and this may be because participants with 
higher subjective well-being had higher patriotism and smaller rGMD in RLPFC” (Takeuchi et 
al., 2016, p. 8). Hence, those with high patriotism scores and high well-being had small rGMD in 
their RLPFC. Another finding was that subjects with higher quality of life (QOL) also displayed 
higher patriotism than those with lower QOL. Moreover, high patriotism scorers showed high 
feelings of security, high self-enhancement, and high attachment to one’s father, which the 
literature “associate[s] with better moods, higher social skills, less selfishness, and less 
problematic behaviors” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 8). Thus, individuals that classify as patriots, or 
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a person who has pride in one’s nation that is independent of “comparisons with other countries,” 
demonstrated not only higher social acceptance but greater subjective well-being (Takeuchi et 
al., 2016, p. 1). 
This study by Takeuchi et al. (2016) contributes to the literature as a whole since it is the 
first to examine specific brain structures concerning nationalism and patriotism. Hence, more 
studies should be conducted to replicate these findings to ensure the findings’ validity, reliability, 
and generalizability. Replicating the findings of Takeuchi et al. (2016) will also account for any 
error in the study that may have occurred. 
The Changing Nature of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism 
Just as Takeuchi et al. (2016) were the first to conduct a study of the brain and patriotism 
along with nationalism, Davidov (2011) was one of the first researchers to conduct a longitudinal 
test involving the stability of patriotism and nationalism over time in several different countries. 
Davidov (2011) conducted a longitudinal test involving twenty-two countries and their 
respective participants’ scores at three total time points of nationalism and constructive 
patriotism, with two of the time points in 1995 and then one in 2003. The purpose of this study 
was to provide valid measurements as to how these relevant concepts may change over time. 
This was done to ensure social scientists have more information regarding the equivalence of 
nationalism and constructive patriotism over time. To clarify briefly what will be concluded in 
this section, Davidov (2011) found that a change did occur between 1995 and 2003 for both 
nationalism and constructive patriotism (CP). A total of half of the countries underwent 
significant changes in nationalism and approximately 80 percent of the countries experienced 
significant changes involving their CP.  
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Davidov (2011) relied on the definition of nationalism that states “an idealization of the 
nation… the conviction of one’s own national superiority and the generalized positive judgment 
of one’s own nation” (Blank and Schmidt, 2003, as cited in Davidov, 2011, p. 89). For a 
definition of patriotism, Davidov (2011) turned to research by Easton (1975) and described the 
concept as rejecting “an idealization of the nation” and reflecting “a constructive and critical 
view of it (Easton, 1975, as cited in Davidov, 2011, p. 89). It is important to understand what 
definitions Davidov (2011) utilized for these terms since multiple definitions exist. Davidov 
(2011) expected that a change in national attachment would occur between 1995 and 2003, 
causing it to be able to be computed by analyzing the International Social Survey Program’s 
(ISSP) national identity data for each of the 22 countries (Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, West Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United States of America).  
To test this hypothesis, data was used from the ISSP’s National Identity Module two 
newest releases in 1995 and 2003. Although 24 total countries were in the 1995 data set and 
thirty-five countries were in the 2003 data set, Davidov (2011) used the 22 countries that were in 
both data sets to inspect change in nationalism and constructive patriotism (CP). 55,370 total 
respondents from 22 countries participated. 28,257 were interviewed in the 1995 study and 
similarly, 27,113 in the 2003 study. Five questions were asked to participants with two of them 
measuring nationalism and three of them involving CP. The CP questions were measured on a 
four-point scale and the nationalism questions were assessed with a five-point scale. To interpret 
the data that was gathered, Davidov (2011) compared construct means over time and interpreted 
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the data using three levels of invariance: configural, metric, and scalar. Each of these levels of 
invariance was needed to test for any invariance in the study to ensure that the comparisons 
being made were valid and reliable. 
Results of the Davidov (2011) study supported the hypothesis that a change would occur 
between the two distinct times in respect to both nationalism and CP. Davidov (2011) found that 
11 countries had a significant change in their mean level of nationalism between 1995 to 2003. 
In Hungary, Russia, and Slovakia, the mean level of nationalism increased. The Philippines also 
exhibited a positive, significant change over time similar to these three countries in their mean 
level of nationalism, but it could not be interpreted as significant as the scalar invariance was not 
“established overtime for this construct” (Davidov, 2011, p. 96). 
Furthermore, Davidov (2011) gave additional support for the hypothesis surrounding 
nationalism because eight countries had a mean level of nationalism that decreased between 
1995 and 2003. These countries were: Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, 
and Sweden. As for CP, results found that a significant change occurred in 18 countries 
(Davidov, 2011). In eight countries, CP increased between 1995 and 2003. These countries 
included: Australia, Great Britain, Hungary, the Philippines, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, and the 
USA. While in ten other countries, CP decreased significantly over this time-span. Austria, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, West Germany, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Poland, and Slovakia were these countries. Hence, as 50 percent of the countries experienced 
significant changes in nationalism and roughly 80 percent of the countries underwent significant 
changes in CP, the study by Davidov (2011) concluded that nationalism, as well as CP, are 
concepts that seem to be able to experience change over time. The literature as a whole has 
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lacked longitudinal studies so to the best of my knowledge, Davidov (2011) has been one of the 
first studies to investigate the macro-level changes of patriotism and nationalism over time by 
using specific comparability measurements. 
Nationalism, Patriotism, and Degradation of Outgroups in Germany 
To take a closer look at nationalism and patriotism in Germany since the next portion of 
this paper will be focusing on this country’s nationalism, a study by Blank and Schmidt (2003) 
will uncover how outgroups tend to be treated when nationalism and patriotism are at the 
forefront. Blank and Schmidt (2003) sought to answer numerous questions involving national 
identity, nationalism, patriotism, and the degradation of foreigners as well as minorities. The 
purpose was to explore the following concerns: 
Can nationalism and patriotism, as specific forms of support for one’s nation, be 
conceptually and empirically distinguished from national identity? How common are 
nationalism and patriotism in Germany? Is there a negative association between 
nationalism and attitude toward minorities and foreigners, and a positive one between 
patriotism and attitude toward minorities and foreigners? Is national identity, in its impact 
on the degradation of ‘others,’ influenced by the two types of attachment to one’s 
country? Can we distinguish between different types of nationalism and patriotism? 
(Blank & Schmidt, 2003, p. 290). 
To give a brief overview of this section, Blank and Schmidt (2003) discovered that national 
identity is the general concept with nationalism and patriotism as subdimensions. The study by 
Blank and Schmidt (2003) also found that despite no significant differences between the former 
East and West German resident subsamples, nationalism was positively related to the 
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degradation of foreignerers as well as anti-Semitism while patriotism was negatively related to 
these same variables.  
To assess these questions, first, Blank and Schmidt (2003) hypothesized that the higher 
the positive national identity of an individual, the higher their degree of nationalism would be. 
Similarly, they predicted a second hypothesis that the higher the positive national identity in a 
person, the higher their degree of patriotism would also be (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). The third 
and fourth hypotheses involved nationalism, the degradation of foreigners, and the degradation 
of Jewish citizens specifically. The third hypothesis was that “the higher the degree of 
nationalism, the stronger the degradation of foreigners” and the fourth hypothesis was that “the 
higher the degree of nationalism, the stronger the degradation of Jewish citizens” (Blank & 
Schmidt, 2003, p. 295). Lastly, the fifth and sixth hypotheses proposed by Blank and Schmidt 
(2003) centered around patriotism, the degradation of foreigners, and the degradation of Jewish 
citizens in particular. Unlike the third and fourth hypotheses, the fifth hypothesis predicted that 
the degradation of foreigners would be weaker as the degree of patriotism heightened and the 
sixth hypothesis expected that the degradation of Jewish citizens would also be weaker as the 
degree of patriotism increased.  
To test these hypotheses, Blank and Schmidt (2003) collected data through a 
representative postal survey from 1996. The first wave of the self-report survey that was 
administered involved 985 former West German residents and 372 former East German residents 
between the ages of 18 and above. After excluding East-West and West-East migrants as well as 
those surveys from participants with missing values, the third-wave sample was made up of 396 
former West German residents and 175 former East German citizens. It is important to note that 
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Blank and Schmidt (2003) refer to the participants throughout the majority of their study as “East 
and West Germans” but they made clear in the abstract that the data collected was from former 
residents of these territories (p. 289). 
To measure national identity, Blank and Schmidt (2003) utilized three indicators by 
Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). The nationalism scale that was used in the study “consisted of 
an indicator of general national pride, three indicators of pride in specific achievements, and 
three items by Schatz et al. (1999) on uncritical conformity” (Blank & Schmidt, 2003, p. 297). In 
total, to measure nationalism in Germany, the study assessed the variables of national pride, 
nationalism, feelings of superiority, ingroup favoritism, and national-related tendencies of 
idealization. On the other hand, to measure patriotism, the study analyzed pride in democratic 
institutions, support for welfare state benefits, support for political co-determination, tolerance 
toward minorities/outgroups, and nation-related expression of a general attitude. Lastly, the 
degradation of outgroups was measured with three indicators. Anti-Semitism was also assessed 
using three separate indicators since this specific form of minority discrimination plays a central 
role in atrocities.  
 Results from the Blank and Schmidt (2003) study found that there is no significant 
difference between the concepts of nationalism and patriotism in former East and West German 
residents. They found that “the standardized estimates show only one small significant difference 
in factor loadings between East and West Germans,” which was national identity (Blank & 
Schmidt, 2003, p. 302). Using covariance matrices as input, results showed that pride in the 
nation and its aspects can be successfully used as a measure for both patriotism and nationalism. 
Hence, despite no significant differences between the East and West subsamples, Blank and 
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Schmidt (2003) gave support for the first and second hypotheses surrounding positive national 
identities, nationalism, and patriotism, solidifying the idea that national identity is the general 
concept and nationalism and patriotism are subdimensions of it. 
Moreover, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth hypotheses were also supported by the results. 
The corresponding coefficients indicated that degradation of outgroups with .98/.98 and 
anti-Semitism with .68/.81 are the results of nationalism in individuals. To contrast this finding, 
the study showed that as patriotism increases, there is a decrease in the degradation of outgroups 
with -.49/-.49 as well as anti-Semitism with -.41/-.48. Anti-Semitism and general degradation of 
outgroups were positively correlated. Lastly, the explained variance was statistically significant 
in the difference between the West German and East German subsample in that anti-Semitism is 
explained by 27 percent in the West German subsample but explained by 38 percent in the East 
German subsample. 
In short, despite a couple of significant differences between the West and East German 
samples, overall, they did not differ very much regarding nationalism and patriotism. Both 
nationalism and patriotism were related to a positive national identity. Nationalism was 
positively correlated with the degradation of foreigners and anti-Semitism whereas patriotism 
was negatively correlated with the degradation of foreigners and anti-Semitism. These findings 
contribute to the literature as a whole by assessing the national identities of Germans and finding 
no substantial difference between West and East Germans, making it in agreement with the 
literature as a whole. As this study took place in 2003, it seems relevant to mention briefly that 
the following year after this study, these differences may have changed significantly in Germany 
as the most nationalist party, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), earned ten 
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percent of the vote in the two German states of Brandenburg as well as Saxony (Dempsey, 
2004). Thus, future research needs to be conducted to assess the current states of patriotism and 
nationalism in Germany.  
The Expanding Influence of Patriotism and Nationalism 
These five studies all shared a common theme: there was an ability to distinguish 
empirically different types of national identities or attitudes such as patriotism and nationalism. 
Results from Schatz et al. (1999) indicated that blind patriotism is a significant positive predictor 
for nationalism and blind and constructive patriotism are expressed in different ways since they 
represent different constructs. Similarly, Dekker et al. (2003) found support for the hypothesis 
that positive national attitudes can be distinguished empirically, including in their third study 
when the Basque youth were all categorized into five different national-attitude-based groups. 
Moreover, Takeuchi et al.'s (2016) study supported this theme in that depending on the 
patriotism or nationalism score of the participant, it resulted in different brain structures being 
affected, leading to different empirical associations between the concepts. Just as Takeuchi et 
al.’s (2016) provided support for an ability to distinguish between the concepts, Davidov’s 
(2011) discoveries on how the concepts can change over time relied on measures that 
differentiated between nationalism and patriotism. Lastly, Blank and Schmidt’s (2003) findings 
shared this theme since they solidified the idea that patriotism and nationalism are two 
subdimensions comprising the general concept of national identity. In conclusion, all five studies 
provide evidence or rely on the theme that national identities or attitudes, including nationalism 
and patriotism, can be distinguished from one another using empirical means. 
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Along with this common theme, four of the five studies, excluding Davidov (2011), also 
had a recurring finding surrounding variables either related to the treatment of others or the 
maintenance of the culture such as cultural contamination, auto-stereotypes, attitude toward 
outgroups, the auto-cliché of political liberties, the maintenance of the culture, cooperativeness, 
compassion, feelings of superiority, and the degradation of outgroups as well as anti-Semitism. 
Schatz et al. (1999) found that cultural contamination, which is “characterized by a heightened 
concern that foreign influences erode the homogeneity and distinctiveness of national culture,” 
was a significant positive predictor along with nationalism and national vulnerability for blind 
patriotism but a significant negative predictor for constructive patriotism (p. 155). Likewise, 
Dekker et al. (2003) uncovered in their second study that auto-stereotypes and attitude toward 
outgroups also had a strong predictive value on nationalism in participants. This finding was 
replicated in their third study involving the Basque culture since two of the major determinants 
for nationalism were the participants’ value of the maintenance of Basque culture, or 
auto-stereotypes, and the auto-cliché of political liberties, or attitude toward outgroups. 
Takeuchi et al. (2016) made several discoveries surrounding cooperativeness, 
compassion, and feelings of superiority with nationalism. Participants’ “nationalism scores” were 
positively correlated with their “feelings of superiority score” and negatively correlated with 
their “cooperativeness score” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 4). Individuals with low compassion and 
high nationalism scores both displayed greater rGMD in their PCC, which was associated with 
the lack of compassion in nationalists as shown by their intolerance to minorities. Blank and 
Schmidt (2003) also displayed this theme involving the treatment of others in their explicit study 
of the degradation of outgroups and anti-Semitism. It was found in the Blank and Schmidt (2003) 
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study on former East and West German residents that as nationalism increased in an individual, 
the degradation of outgroups, as well as anti-Semitism, also increased. This was unlike 
patriotism, where their findings indicated a decrease in the degradation of outgroups and 
anti-Semitism as patriotism increased. It should also be noted due to the exclusion of the fourth 
study from this recurring theme in the literature that although Davidov’s (2011) study lacked a 
variable involving the treatment of others, future research could explore their finding that the 
mean level of nationalism increased in Hungary, Russia, and Slovakia to identify how the 
country’s attitude toward outgroups may be a factor affecting nationalism as a whole. 
Consequently, the findings of the five articles also differed because certain aspects of the 
concepts were only assessed in certain studies, making each study have a somewhat different 
focus and leading to different results. For example, Schatz et al. (1999) studied political 
knowledge, information-gathering, and activism as well as conservatism, symbolic vs. 
instrumental behaviors, and selective focus of information. None of the other studies analyzed 
these variables so Schatz et al. (1999) provided the literature review results that showed how 
blind patriotism is a strong predictor for nationalism and blind patriots tend to be less politically 
knowledgeable, more conservative, Republican, prefer symbolic behaviors, and reading pro U.S. 
information. This differs substantially from the Dekker et al. (2003) study where the focus of the 
study was to investigate national attitudes as a hierarchy and factors that lead to the development 
of nationalism. As a result, regional-national attitudes were also studied and this was the only 
study to mention how region rather than country could be an aspect of a person’s national 
identity. Other factors such as concern for the future among others were also measured that were 
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not present in the other research, giving more substance to the evaluation for determinants of 
nationalism. 
Likewise, Takeuchi et al. (2016) also went in a different direction than the other studies 
presented since this was the first study to be published analyzing brain structures of gray matter 
and nationalism as well as patriotism. The findings differed from the others since they resulted 
from a method of gathering data that included not only a self-report survey or interview but scans 
of the brain. This led to unique findings that none of the other studies discovered such as that 
high patriotism scorers showed similar brain scans as subjects with high quality of life and that 
they also displayed high feelings of security, high self-enhancement, and a high attachment to 
one’s father. Davidov (2011) focused on a different facet of these constructs and assessed the 
concreteness of patriotism and nationalism over time, which none of the other studies did as they 
were not longitudinal tests. His findings indicate that they can change over time, which was 
substantiated in multiple countries. Lastly, Blank and Schmidt (2003) provided findings 
involving both East and West Germans following the reunification of Germany and was the only 
of these studies to find that there is no difference between nationalism and patriotism in East and 
West Germans. Additionally, unlike other studies, a very specific type of degradation of 
outgroups/minorities was measured to evaluate anti-Semitism in Germany and its’ relationship 
with nationalism. Just as predicted by Blank and Schmidt (2003), their findings showed a strong 
positive correlation between nationalism and anti-Semitism.  
By combining the findings of the five studies, it is possible to gather a more complete 
view of the relationship between patriotism and nationalism, their characteristics, and how each 
concept relates to the treatment of outgroups. This thorough perspective also provides the 
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opportunity to learn how the literature fully supports that there is not only an ability to 
distinguish between various national attitudes but that there are numerous empirical findings that 
declare nationalism and patriotism as being separate phenomena.  
The strengths of the sources include the variety of themes that were covered such as brain 
structures and stability over time, the variety of countries that the studies were conducted in, the 
different methods of study such as longitudinal, the replicated findings in the studies, and that the 
findings in each study either were the first contribution to the literature or were in agreement 
with previous research. In contrast, there were a few weaknesses to the sources used in this 
literature review. These include firstmost that the most recent source is from 2016. Moreover, 
limitations also were apparent in that the studies all lacked diversity in the population samples 
and the samples may not be generalizable as mostly young people participated in the studies and 
each researcher analyzed specific countries and regions. 
In conclusion, the driving force behind this literature review involves the common 
themes that emerged throughout the studies, which were the apparent differences between 
patriotism and nationalism that can be empirically distinguished and the relationship between 
nationalism and, as categorized in numerous ways throughout the studies, the degradation of 
outgroups or minorities. It is important to recognize the relationship between blind patriotism 
and nationalism to understand how patriotism and nationalism may be confused with one another 
at times. This perplexity makes this literature review even more relevant as the studies have 
shown that constructive patriotism and nationalism stem from, are characterized by, and predict 
very different outcomes, especially when it comes to the treatment of people who are not in the 
same group they are in. 
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With the world experiencing what has been called the ‘Refugee Crisis,’ which according 
to the International Rescue Committee (n.d.) involves approximately 80 million displaced people 
and refugees, investigations of national identities by researchers such as Schatz et al. (1999), 
Dekker et al. (2003), Takeuchi et al. (2016), Davidov (2011), and Blank and Schmidt (2003) are 
key in providing research that will help to clarify why some individuals do not want to open their 
borders when there are people in need. A similar discussion has been taking place in Germany, 
which will have two domains of nationalism discussed in the next portion of this paper. The 
Norweigan Refugee Council (2020) noted that Germany received 1,191,000 refugees or 1.5 
percent of their population. This statistic alone shows the significance behind understanding 
nationalism and the degradation of outgroups to prevent ethnic violence and more. Future 
research should continue to assess this relationship by analyzing how ethnicity may play a role in 
nationalism and answering new questions such as how stable is the association of nationalism 
and the degradation of outgroups over time.  
 
Two Domains of German Post-WWII Nationalism 
Now that I have shown the psychological discussion on patriotism and nationalism, I am 
going to be talking about nationalism because the empirical relationship found by Blank and 
Schmidt (2003) between the degradation of outgroups and nationalism as well as the brain 
correlations displayed by Takeuchi et al. (2016) are causes for concern, whereas nonconcerning, 
almost completely opposite findings were found for patriotism. Instead of continuing to argue 
that there is a difference between patriotism and nationalism as backed by evidence in multiple 
studies from the literature review, I decided to concentrate on nationalism rather than patriotism 
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         38 
since the relationships found involving nationalism pose threatening outcomes. Nationalism will 
be considered in terms of where it is being fostered and displayed within Germany after World 
War II. The next major portion of this thesis will involve an analysis of two domains that exhibit 
and promote nationalism, fairy tale films and soccer. The purpose of this analysis is to not only 
bring light to these ideas, but to argue as a whole that nationalism is not just a thing of the past as 
ideas surrounding the concept continue to be depicted in films today, which is why the analysis 
evaluates four separate films. The films, “Das Zaubermännchen” (Engel, 1960) and “Wie 
heiratet man einen König” (Simon, 1969), are discussed in the “Märchenfilme” (fairy tale films) 
section, whereas a historical-fiction film, “Das Wunder von Bern” (Wortmann, 2003), and a 
documentary by the same director, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” (Wortmann, 2006), are 
examined in the “Fußball” (soccer) section.  
To give some brief historical context, the division of Germany after World War II in 
1949 set the precedent for the following four decades of German history. The resulting two 
German states of West Germany, or the Federal Republic of Germany, and East Germany, or the 
German Democratic Republic created “an ‘iron curtain’ dividing West from East, the free world 
and democracy from dictatorship and communism,” thereby creating two separate states with 
separate political systems, foreign relations, culture, German identities, and living standards, 
among numerous other contrasting themes that lasted for roughly fifty years (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 
136). Thus, when Germany reunified officially as one state in the fall of 1990, tensions were 
high between “Wessis” (westerners) and “Ossis” (easterners) due to the coalescence of two 
societies that had developed upon starkly different ideologies.  1
1 In the West, the ideology was liberal democracy and in the East, it was democratic centralism based on 
Marxist-Leninist theory (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 142). 
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This is important to the discussion of nationalism in Germany since the concept became 
prevalent once again contrastingly in both West and East Germany as well as after Germany’s 
reunification. I say ‘once again’ because Germany has a long history of nationalism. The concept 
plays a central theme in Germany’s development from well before Hitler’s reign to the present 
time.  Two domains of German post-WWII nationalism that will be analyzed in-depth are 2
introduced in the upcoming sections: fairy tale films with the “Märchenfilme” produced by the 
“Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft,” or DEFA, in East Germany during the 1960s; and 
sports-related nationalism with “Fußball” as depicted in films by Sonke Wortmann in the 2000s 
during the now unified Germany. Although these domains may appear inharmonious together, 
fairy tales and sporting events both bring out stereotypically German passion through the 
common perception of “Märchen,” or fairy tales, as belonging to Germany and the widely-held 
importance of “Fußball,” or soccer. Both of these domains within Germany offer a site for 
individuals to express their national identities, causing German nationalism to often be on 
display in fairy tales and sporting events. For that reason, each of these distinct locales will be 
argued as fostering and displaying nationalism to an extent in their respective Germany. 
“Märchenfilme” 
In this section, I will give a brief background on “Märchenfilme” and explain the 
relevance behind these films to a discussion on nationalism. From there, I will go on to analyze 
two specific films, “Das Zaubermännchen”​ ​(Engel, 1960) and “Wie heiratet man einen König” 
(Simon, 1969), that were made in East Germany to show how they fostered and displayed 
2 For instance, there was concern with the German national identity in Prussia following and during the 
Napoleonic era as well as with “the crisis in Franco-German relations in 1840” and these are just two out 
of numerous junctures (Breuilly, 1990, p. 659, 662). 
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nationalism. An integral aspect of East German (GDR) culture was their state studio, known as 
DEFA (“Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft”), that produced “twenty-three feature-length 
live-action films for children based on tales by the Brothers Grimm” from 1946 to 1990 (Shen, 
2011, p. 70).  “Märchenfilme,” or fairy tale films, were an inherent part of the GDR as a result of 3
the influence the medium of film can have on its viewers, especially when the film industry is 
compassed by the state (Blessing, 2010, p. 234). Combined with the fact that DEFA both 
“claimed to be the true inheritor of a rich German film tradition” and “enabled a lively national 
cinema for the GDR that, as a very public national industry, proved East Germany’s legitimacy 
as a sovereign state that was not the weaker sister of the larger, western half of Germany,” the 
films exhibit a variety of nationalistic ideas, such as believing one’s country is superior to others 
(Blessing, 2010, p. 238). The underlying goal of DEFA, where a majority of the filmmakers were 
very loyal to the party, was to create not only a distinct ‘national cinema,’ but to also teach future 
generations through their films how to become good citizens of the GDR (Blessing, 2010, p. 
235-236). 
Although Haase (1993) argues that some people see adaptations of the classic Grimm 
fairy tales as “monument desecration” (p. 383),  the common attribution of Grimm fairy tales as 4
3 ​The Grimm Brothers’ tales have been said to promote nationalistic ideas just as much as political 
figures, even before DEFA adapted them. The two brothers seemingly always “emphasized the 
Germanness of their tales” and were convinced that their strength, which included the talent they had for 
writing, came “from the soil of the German Fatherland” (Snyder, 1978, p. 1, 10). Snyder (1978) suggests 
that the praiseworthy, ‘Germanic’ traits in the stories include “authoritarianism, militarism, violence 
toward the outsider, and the strict enforcement of discipline” (p. 2). Whether the Grimms consciously or 
unconsciously stressed these particular traits, their fairy tales, which originated from folk tales and were 
spread through word-of-mouth by peasants, have, per Snyder (1978), made these traits crucial elements of 
the German national character (p. 4). 
4 ​Haase (1993) argues that some people might view something as minor as changing the German spelling 
of Snow White from the original, ​Sneewittchen, ​to the modern form, ​Schneewittchen​, as “monument 
desecration” (p. 383-384).  
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the property of the “Volk​,​” or the German word for people of a nation,  further reiterates 5
“Märchenfilme” as a relevant moment of German nationalism. While some traditionalist 
Germans may watch with horror and anguish as the classic Grimm tales are modernized, 
Goritsas (2017) argues that DEFA “sought to preserve and recreate a fairy-tale environment 
tailored to an enlightened social realist aesthetic in the service of modernity, be it for educational 
purposes, moral lessons of right and wrong, entertainment, social and/or political concerns” (p. 
123). The focus of this analysis will be on DEFA films from the 1960s since films in this 
time-period were “co-opted to serve the official rhetoric that the newly established proletarian 
state is antifascist and anticapitalist” (Shen, 2011, p. 71).  A common theme that emerges 6
throughout many DEFA “Märchenfilme”, such as “Das Zaubermännchen”​ ​(Rumpelstiltskin) and 
“Wie heiratet man einen König”​ ​(How to Marry a King) among others,​ ​is anti-capitalism. The 
presence of anti-capitalistic ideas like denouncing greed, a lack of decorum, and collectivism all 
reinforce the cultural norms of the GDR that aim to show that the GDR was not the “weaker 
sister” of the Federal Republic of Germany or West Germany, but that they were, in fact, the 
superior sister (Blessing, 2010, p. 238). 
The usage of unrealistic fairy tales to push real-life cultural norms onto citizens will be 
argued as promoting nationalism because, as Dekker et al. (2003) discovered, a major 
determinant for the development of nationalism is national socialization, which involves “the 
processing of affective messages from others about one’s country and people” (p. 349). National 
5 “Das Volk,” is a word that is still utilized in Germany. However, Germans are careful to use this word 
given the context because “Volk” has been marked by discourses on nationalism. For instance, a type of 
music in Germany called “Volksmusik,” which would translate in English to “folk music,” is no such 
thing. “Volksmusik” is widely considered as fascist since the Nazis used this music to urge their “cynical 
and ultra-reactionary goals of German fascism” (Wicke, 1985, p. 149). 
6 Films in the 1970s moved from the same critique of regimes exhibited in the 1950s and 1960s to an 
inward critique of the GDR (Shen, 2011, p. 71). 
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socialization is seen within fairy tale films in the form of discreet messages that foster 
nationalism, and like Mummendey, Klink, and Brown (2001) explain, nationalism “includes the 
view that one’s country is superior to others and hence should be dominant” (p. 160). East 
Germans were expected to be modest, obedient citizens who should each expect to be treated the 
same as every other East German, work for what they had, and not own any ornate material 
items as Western German consumerism necessitated (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 188-189). Despite the 
view that East Germany was starting over from the Nazi ideology leading up to and throughout 
WWII, there was still tension since although East Germans “could indulge in a little national 
pride” (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 189), the fairy tales that DEFA launched towards the public projected 
cultural norms that emphasized the GDR’s superiority over the West, thereby fostering 
nationalism. “Das Zaubermännchen”​ ​directed by Engel (1960) and “Wie heiratet man einen 
König” directed by Simon (1969) are the two specific films that will now be analyzed in-depth. 
“Das Zaubermännchen” 
In this subsection, I will firstly compare the Grimms’ fairy tale to the DEFA film 
adaption and then go on to describe how the DEFA film fosters nationalism through promoting 
anti-capitalism and labor-intensive viewpoints. Similar to the Grimms’ fairy tale 
“Rumpelstiltskin”, the film, “Das Zaubermännchen” (Engel, 1960), involves a miller lying about 
how his daughter can spin straw into gold. When the king hears this, the daughter is brought to 
the king’s castle to demonstrate her skill and provide money to the state. Knowing that she 
possesses no such talent, the daughter is upset. Then, Rumpelstiltskin appears out of nowhere. 
He indicates that he will spin the straw to gold if she gives him something valuable in return. The 
daughter agrees. The first time, she gives him her treasured necklace. After the king returns to 
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see the gold she has spun, she is ordered to spin again and again. The second time, she gives 
away a ring. However, the third time Marie must spin, she lacks a valuable item to give 
Rumpelstiltskin so she agrees to give away her first-born child. Following this arrangement, she 
marries the king and becomes pregnant. When Rumpelstiltskin appears to collect his end of the 
bargain, he agrees to give the peasant’s daughter three days to find out his name.  
This is where the DEFA adaptation differs from the Grimms’ tale. In the film, she 
discovers his name through the help of her friend, Hans, but in the Grimm fairy tale, the daughter 
finds out the name through a messenger. This is significant since Hans is one of the characters 
who has a role that is not in the original Grimms’ tale. Along with how Rumpelstiltskin’s name 
is discovered, other differences between the two versions are, most importantly, apparent in the 
portrayal of the main character, Rumpelstiltskin, and then, the naming of the characters. 
Rumpelstiltskin is depicted more cruelly in Grimms’ version, which makes the audience less 
sympathetic towards him. DEFA frames Rumpelstiltskin very differently as I explain below. 
Since a film requires more length than a short fairy-tale story, the characters naturally 
have more room to develop, but an important distinction lies in which characters in “Das 
Zaubermännchen”​ ​are given a specific name. Where the Grimms’ tale gives only the one name 
of Rumpelslitskin, the DEFA film gives many. This is a stark difference between the two 
because the Grimms’ version centers around just one name in that the daughter is never named 
and has to figure out the one name to keep her child. Meanwhile, the DEFA film gives a name to 
the peasant’s daughter (Marie) and the miller (Kunz). However, in spite of this general tendency 
of naming more characters in DEFA, the king still lacks a name, just as the Grimm fairy tale king 
did. 
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The lack of a name for the king and king’s treasurer in the DEFA film points to a socialist 
aesthetic as Engel (1960) was trying to keep the public from relating to the characters that held 
roles which are not labor-intensive. This is to prevent viewers from developing ideas that one 
does not have to work to earn their role in society, which would not have promoted the cultural 
norms that lead to national socialization. By showing that the characters who were successful 
and superior did not give in to greed, an anti-capitalist economy is being encouraged rather than 
a capitalist one.  This is apparent in the film because film watchers never get to see a shot that is 7
filmed from the king’s or his treasurer’s point-of-view. This is unlike other characters such as 
Hans, who is an industrious worker at a mill and ultimately uncovers the infamous name of the 
tale. 
By not showing the audience the perspectives of the king or his treasurer and displaying 
point-of-views from laborers like Hans, Engel (1960) is reinforcing this idea that he does not 
want the public to identify with capitalism since being greedy and selfish is associated with 
Western consumerism, which is the opposite of what contributes to East German superiority 
where labor is done by everyone. Thus, despite the king’s transition from a greedy man who goes 
along with his treasurer’s desires for more gold to a loving husband and father willing to do 
anything to figure out Rumpelstiltskin’s name in the film, the king keeps his title. As the title of a 
king displays a hierarchy in the kingdom, withholding a name from the king not only urges 
viewers not to identify with the character but to reject the hierarchy that occurs when a king is in 
7 It is important to note that the miller, Kunz, received a name in the DEFA film and the king’s treasurer 
did not. I believe this is because even after his daughter married a king, his status as a miller never went 
away. In fact, his daughter’s marriage to the king led him to start to work as Kunz went from not working 
in the beginning to having to work at the end. Hence, the addition of a name to the miller contributes to 
promoting the common East German theme of labor since one must contribute to society through work as 
shown in their “in theory no unemployment” (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 195). 
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charge. Having a king goes against the socialist agenda of putting the means of production in the 
hands of the workers. Hence, the king stands as an anonymous force because giving the king a 
name would make it not only seem like a king can be anything other than a selfish, greedy man, 
but that a class hierarchy is a righteous system.  
Along with a lack of names for certain individualistic characters who show Western 
capitalistic ideals, DEFA’s change in renaming the story “Das Zaubermännchen”​, ​which 
translates to little magic man, was deliberate as they wanted the character of Rumpelstiltskin to 
be viewed differently than in the Grimm fairy tale. They challenged the previous notion that 
Rumpelstiltskin is inherently bad by spreading anti-capitalistic views that make the West seem 
inferior; thereby, making West German capitalism, which is equated to greed, unappealing to 
viewers. For instance, rather than being seen as cruel for wanting to take a child away from the 
birth parents, Rumpelstiltskin is presented as justified in his lofty stipulation. He demands the 
child from the king and future queen since he fears what would occur if a child had “to grow up 
among people for whom gold is the most important thing” as depicted in the film (Engel, 1960, 
0:43:10). East German culture was taught to repudiate any form of greed; hence, anti-capitalism 
was a common theme among “Märchenfilme”, making it even the goal of a partnership between 
DEFA and another film studio, Barrandov, in Czechoslovakia, which was state-socialist during 
this time.  8
“Wie heiratet man einen König” 
8 The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (​Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland) ​pressed heavily for 
films with other State-socialist countries to be made. It was not acceptable for DEFA to only be working 
with partners from capitalist states such as West Germany, France, and more (Silberman, 2006, p. 21). 
Thus, an alliance between DEFA and Barrandov was created and films, such as ​Drei Haselnüsse für 
Aschenbrödel, ​were developed and watched on screen (Skopal, 2018, p. 136, 140). 
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Likewise, it is not just in “Das Zaubermännchen” where the hidden tendencies of 
nationalism were spread by degrading capitalism;  the film, “Wie heiratet man einen König​,​” 9
also promotes GDR nationalism by making the powerful look dense. In this subsection, I will 
compare the Grimm fairy tale to the DEFA film and discuss not only the idea that the powerful 
appeared foolish but how the courtyard acted as an egalitarian space for everyone. Based on the 
Grimm fairy tale, “Die kluge Bauerntochter” (the clever peasant’s daughter), the film “Wie 
heiratet man einen König” (how one marries a king), directed by Rainer Simon for DEFA in 
1969, follows a somewhat similar storyline to the predecessor Grimm story. Both involve a 
peasant and his wise, clever daughter who outsmarts the king in a trial of wits to prove her 
“Klugheit,”  her cleverness. This trial of wits was to free her father, who ended up in prison after 
finding a gold piece and reporting it to the king who questioned where and how he found the 
gold. Both versions have the one task involving three riddles of having to “come to me [the king] 
not clothed, not naked, not riding, not walking, not in the road, and not of the road, and if thou 
canst do that I will marry thee” posed by the king to the peasant’s daughter and likewise, both 
depict the peasant’s daughter successfully passing this riddle “by dressing in a fishing net, 
having her net tied to a donkey, and carrying her just above the ground by using the ruts in the 
road” (Grimm & Grimm, 2019; Simon, 1969, 0:33:40, 0:35:00-0:40:00). Since she successfully 
solves the riddle, a marriage follows. 
9 Another example where anti-capitalism notions are common throughout the film is ​Das hölzerne 
Kälbchen, ​or the Little Wooden Calf, since at the end, the little farmer, who crafted a wooden calf as he 
had no calves of his own, has “wiped out the entire village and becomes a rich man” (Shen, 2011, p. 75). 
By clearing the whole village of calves, he has shown individualistic, egoistic motivations, which the film 
views critically as bad. Such selfish actions could only be present in a capitalistic society, not in a society 
like the GDR.  
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Lastly, both versions involve an argument at the end between the couple due to the king’s 
decision in a dispute among soldiers to give the foal either back to its owner or back to where it 
was at, which was not in the land of who it belonged to. The queen was then confronted by the 
foal’s rightful owner and she gave him advice on how to get his foal back. Upon hearing of his 
queen’s actions behind his back, the king told her to leave and take what she deemed most 
precious. Clever as always, the peasant’s daughter, or queen, put a sleeping aid in the king’s 
drink and brought him home with her; hence, when he woke up, he was told how he was most 
precious to her and they stayed together. 
While “Wie heiratet man einen König” resembles the Grimm tale it is based on in many 
ways, Simon (1969) adapts this film by adding a beginning scene where the king takes requests 
and complaints in the courtyard. This scene allows the audience to start to see the type of king he 
is through his actions and interactions with the peasants in his kingdom. The courtyard in “Wie 
heiratet man einen Köni​g​”​ ​allows the audience to see how the king and his courtiers in this film 
are portrayed as dense, “stupid, corrupt, and preposterous” (Shen, 2011, p. 81), as shown when 
the king comes out of his palace, playing chess by himself, and then proclaims that he won the 
game (Simon, 1969, 0:05:43). Other examples out of numerous within the film of people the film 
positions as stand-ins for contemporary capitalists are when the king does a magic trick with the 
money he receives for a peasant and keeps half of the money for himself even though the peasant 
rightfully deserves it all as compensation and when the king continuously shoots a rifle in the air 
at nothing (Simon, 1969, 0:10:26, 0:23:42). These displays of idiocracy associate the king title, 
which is traditionally coupled with a righteous hierarchy just like in “Das Zaubermännchen,” to 
stupidity and ignorance; thereby, equating any system where richer classes profit off the poor, 
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         48 
whether it be the monarchy of the film or the capitalism of the West German neighbors, to be 
worthless and a joke. As a result, this implies that capitalism makes people lesser in that they are 
foolish. 
Added to this display of stupidity among the powerful, Simon’s (1969) film also 
promotes the idea that the courtyard of the palace is “unpretentious and accessible to everyone” 
(Shen, 2011, p. 81). There is underlying tension between my previous argument and the current 
one I will make since I am arguing that the monarchy is run by fools, but even though they are 
laughable, they keep a very egalitarian courtyard. However, these arguments are not really pitted 
against each other because the people, not the monarchy, were the ones who kept the courtyard 
functioning properly while the king and his courtiers made jokes. This is seen throughout the 
movie, such as in the scene where the king does a magic trick (Simon, 1969, 0:10:26), in that 
chaos only started among the people after the king came and acted his usual silly self.  
The courtyard is shot in numerous long shots that show everyone on stage and promote 
the idea of collectivism. This aim of collectivism is also seen in the farmer’s daughter’s plan 
when she outwits the king in the last riddle because the peasants help pave the way for her to 
solve the riddle. They let her use their items such as a fishing net without question and as she 
makes her way back to the courtyard “not clothed, not naked, not riding, not walking, not in the 
road, and not on the road” (Simon, 1969, 0:34:26), the peasants start to fight out against the 
guards and follow the farmer’s daughter back to the courtyard to show the king that she has 
solved the riddle (Simon, 1969, 0:36:24). Moreover, when she and the king decided to have a 
wedding, the entire kingdom was invited and celebrated together (Simon, 1969, 0:46:25). Thus, 
it can be explicitly said that every major scene in the film involves a variety of people all 
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working together, fighting together, and celebrating together. This contributes to the fostering of 
nationalism in East Germany as East Germans believed they were collectively starting over, 
which would require every citizen to get behind the idea that East Germans were all in this 
together.  
No to Decorations, Yes to Collectivism 
In this subsection, I will consider how both of the films of “Das Zaubermännchen”​ ​and 
“​Wie heiratet man einen König”​ ​take an oddly non-socialist idea of a woman marrying a king to 
utilize the charming, traditional aspect of a fairy tale to draw the audience in. They share the 
same themes of little decoration and huge collective efforts to display and foster nationalism. 
Both films display a lack of decoration, which fosters nationalism in that lavish decorations are 
not present in the DEFA films as they are in films that were created in the West. In “Das 
Zaubermännchen​,​”​ ​the gold that Marie spins for the king is arguably the shiniest object filmed 
other than the items that Marie offers Rumpelstiltskin towards the end of the film in an attempt 
to keep her child (Engel, 1960, 0:42:36). Even the powerful in the film adorn themselves with 
little jewelry and live in a less lavish palace as compared to the live-action fairy tale movies that 
were made in West Germany years before these movies such as “Sissi” (Marischka, 1955) or that 
are made today in Hollywood such as “Beauty and the Beast” (Condon, 2017) and “Cinderella” 
(Branagh, 2015), among others. With Sissi in “Sissi” coming from a higher class family, it is 
relevant to note that even her plain clothes are more embellished than Marie’s in “Das 
Zaubermännchen.” Moreover, despite both Belle and Cinderella in the remaining respective 
films coming from a lower-class family, they still are also wearing more lavish clothes at the end 
of their films than Marie. In “Wie heiratet man einen König​,​”​ ​the wedding of the peasant’s 
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daughter and the king is also depicted relatively plainly as compared to the weddings in the quasi 
historical movie, “Sissi” (Marischka, 1955), that has many fairy tale characteristics (a girl in the 
forest) as well as in the current fairy tale Hollywood films, “Beauty and the Beast” and 
“Cinderella​.​” The peasant’s daughter’s dress in “Wie heiratet man einen König” is red, a color 
that is coincidentally related to labor movements. When this red dress is placed next to the 
dresses of women marrying into royalty in films like “Sissi” 14 years before “Wie heiratet man 
einen König,” or movies such as “Beauty and the Beast”​ ​or “Cinderella” that are made today, it 
severely lacks embellishment and decorum. This is apparent even after taking into consideration 
the minute gold accents on the sleeves of the peasant’s daughter’s dress (Simon, 1969, 0:46:23). 
While it is not certain that DEFA purposely left out having the actors wear lots of jewelry and 
major gold accents on the dresses they wear, it is definite that the audience would notice what the 
actors were wearing. Hence, viewers may have perceived this as being able to achieve a ‘happily 
ever after’ without needing the displays of wealth and power that the West partakes in. 
Country-wide efforts are shown in both films as well, which also promotes nationalism 
by indicating that a collectivist society is superior to individualistic societies. “Das 
Zaubermännchen”​ ​showcases these efforts when the entire kingdom is searching for 
Rumpelstiltskin’s name (Engel, 1960, 0:53:17). Despite the effort being a failure and having only 
Hans, an individual, discover the name, the country-wide effort is significant since the Grimm 
version of Rumpelstiltskin does not have one (Grimm & Grimm, 2001a). Having the entire 
kingdom search is promoting collectivism since although it is one family’s problem, everyone is 
working together to solve the one issue as if it were their own. Similar efforts are also shown in 
“Wie heiratet man einen König​.​”​ ​This film depicts the country-wide effort when the peasant’s 
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         51 
daughter has solved the riddle and is riding to the courtyard while the rest of the peasants are all 
fighting against the guards so that she can get through successfully (Simon, 1969, 0:36:24). 
Collectivism is shown here since the rest of the peasants are helping the peasant’s daughter, even 
though the fate of the riddle may be of little importance to them. The idea of working together 
and helping one another despite getting nothing in return is very influential in collectivism and 
by having these scenes in these “Märchenfilme,” these collectivist ideas spread at large to 
demonstrate how collectivism grants a fairy tale ending. Without these country-wide efforts, both 
films would have ended very differently​. ​I argue that Hans would have never known to search 
for the name if a country-wide effort of collectivism had not taken place first since Marie never 
told anyone about the deal with Rumpelstiltskin until the king said that they will need help from 
the whole kingdom. Hence, I do not believe Marie would have told Hans about the situation if 
the entire kingdom had not known. Moreover, collectivism allowed the peasant’s daughter to 
outsmart the king, which individualism would not have done.  
I analyzed these two films to contend how they differently display anti-capitalistic ideas 
that promote nationalism in each respective context. The analysis of “Das Zaubermännchen” 
delves into the plot to show how minute storyline details such as names of these characters can 
promote nationalism. The investigation of “Wie heiratet einen König” indulges less into the plot 
and explains the presence of nationalistic ideas through viewing anti-capitalism as it is shown in 
the specific types of shots being used and particular scenes that emphasize the GDR’s superiority 
over the greedy West. By examining one film’s plot and the other film’s mise-en-scene and 
cinematography, I focused on specific anti-capitalism themes in both films. I could have done it 
the other way around and discussed how the plot’s details of “Wie heiratet man einen König” 
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may also be presenting anti-capitalism themes and vice versa for “Das Zaubermännchen”​ ​with 
the aesthetics. I also could have talked about many other “Märchenfilme” and critiqued how each 
show glimpses of nationalism hidden within them. 
In conclusion, although East Germany never intended to foster nationalism ​per se​, both 
films do so by promoting anti-capitalistic ideas that contribute to the nationalistic view of East 
Germany being superior to countries with capitalist economies and consumerist ideologies such 
as West Germany. The films both also take this oddly non-socialist idea of a woman marrying a 
king to utilize the charming, traditional aspect of a fairy tale to draw the audience in. A common 
feature of a fairy tale is that it is not realistic and takes the reader to an imaginary realm; thus, 
people typically do not expect to leave the viewing of a DEFA film with new ideas about reality. 
However, by seeing the depiction of ideas that are familiar to their reality of East Germany, a 
new sense of pride in their country might have appealed to citizens since the films extend to 
“audiences an opportunity to learn about their society’s mores and their own role in a nation” 
(Blessing, 2010, p. 233). Despite East Germans' lack of indulgence in national pride, the use of 
films are based on Grimm fairy tales, which are widely considered as nationalist. Indeed, “the 
Nazis demanded that every German household own a copy of the Grimm collection,” make it 
hard to believe that the viewers were not affected by the nationalism that would be brought forth 
(Harshbarger, 2013,p. 492). 
“Fußball” 
In this section, I will analyze how soccer displays and fosters nationalism in a similar 
fashion as the fairy tale films did. For the discussion, I will start with a theme of either emotional 
identification or the us versus them dynamic and then, I will argue how the films I am 
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investigating show these nationalistic themes. The two films are from the same director, Sönke 
Wortmann, but one is a historical fiction film from 2003 called “Das Wunder von Bern” and the 
other is a documentary from 2006 called “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen.” As with fairy 
tales, German culture has always been proud of their “Fußball” (soccer). Indeed it is the most 
popular sport in the country according to the interest of the population from 2018 to 2020 
(NCES, 2020). Even the people who are not ecstatic with joy about the sport are still able to 
become intrigued when the “Weltmeisterschaft” (World Cup) begins and “Deutschland” is 
playing. According to a study by Ismer, Beyer, Solms-Baruth, and von Scheve (2017) conducted 
in 2002, even the 16 percent, which is a really small percentage, of the German population who 
had “no special interest in football” was able to become interested in the World Cup (p. 559).  10
During the World Cup in 2006, which was held in Germany, 83 percent of the total German 
population watched at least one of the World Cup matches that were on television (Ismer et al., 
2017, p. 559).  These numbers are consistent with my personal experience of traveling to 11
Germany and being told that to get the full, authentic German experience, I should attend a 
“Fußballspiel” (soccer game). What most people do not contemplate is what the sport can 
promote within the country, which is nationalism. 
Expressions of German ‘banal nationalism,’ to use Schiller’s (2015) term/coinage, are 
becoming the norm during European football championships (p. 177). Ervedosa (2020) argues 
that when the nature of the game of soccer is considered alone, it “operates with a strong 
10 In this same study by Ismer et al. (2017) from 2002, “40 percent of the population over 14 years old 
belonged to the euphoric type with regard to football, with both a very high level of interest and emotional 
attachment to the sport” (p. 559). This further shows the popularity of soccer in Germany, particularly for 
the youth. 
11 This trend has continued. Similar figures were also found for the German population’s viewing of the 
2010 World Cup in South Africa (Ismer et al., 2017, p. 559). 
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mechanism of identification and exclusion which is also key in nationalist narratives” (p. 45). 
Meanwhile, Ismer et al. (2017) argue that various scholars tend to view major football events as 
Janus-headed since their efforts on social inclusion either bring a diverse audience together or 
promote exclusion and rejection of prejudiced and minority groups such as “migrants, ethnic or 
religious minorities, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) groups or persons with 
disabilities” (p. 554-555). This shows how soccer can have profound effects, making it logical to 
contend that soccer in Germany is capable of fostering nationalism. 
Two major questions arise when thinking about Germans and their soccer: why is it that 
Germans regard “Fußball” so highly and closely to their national identities; and what 
implications does this have for fostering nationalism? These provoking questions surrounding 
“Fußball,” German identity, and post-WWII nationalism will be analyzed in-depth by taking a 
step back in time to the early 2000s to view a unified Germany that had been in place for around 
10 years and how Sönke Wortmann, a film director, affected and reflected the country’s 
perception by displaying the “Fußball” phenomenon in Germany through a historical-fiction 
film, “Das Wunder von Bern” in 2003, and a documentary, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” 
in 2006. 
German identities have a strong root in “Fußball” because, given the country’s history, 
many Germans were wary of identifying emotionally with their country due to “being regularly 
confronted at school and in the media with the horrors of the Holocaust” (Ervedosa, 2020, p. 49). 
This created a longing for positive identification with Germany, which was a wish that became 
even more deep-seated once East Germany and West Germany were reunified on the 3rd of 
October in 1990 (Ervedosa, 2020, p. 49). Recently, soccer has become one area that Germans 
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feel they can showcase their national pride without fear of association with nationalism or 
right-wing extremism (Sullivan & Dumont, 2014, p. 97).  Sullivan (2014) claims that “the 12
[2006] World Cup may therefore have provided an opportunity to experience a form of 
unconstrained national pride, which some members of a new generation appeared to want to 
experience as a depoliticized and largely enjoyable new effect” (p. 129). Understanding why 
Germans hold soccer so closely to their national identities is important to grasp because, just as 
“Märchenfilme” unconsciously fostered nationalism in believing one’s country is superior to 
others, “Fußball” displays nationalism by forging an intense emotional identification with one’s 
own country, similarly creating an us (Germany) vs. them (any other country) dynamic of 
exclusion. 
The Emotional Identification in “Fußball” 
In this subsection, I will show how both of Wortmann’s (2003, 2006) films promote 
positive, emotional identification to Germany, which is an aspect of nationalism. Given many 
Germans’ constant state of evaluating their national identity, many have avoided politics 
altogether. Political attitudes following the disasters of the war could be characterized by feelings 
such as apathy, weariness toward politics, and concern about how they will get through their 
day-to-day living (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 117-118). This worn-out attitude toward specific politics 
that wanted to continue with forms used in the past is the foundation of the popular political 
position of “ohne mich” (without me) to discussions on re-arming Germany (Fulbrook, 2015). 
This avoidance of politics by many during the 1950s that lingered for decades made it so that the 
12 To further explain this point, the full quote from the text reads “international football tournaments give 
many Germans the opportunities to demonstrate unified support for the national team and encourage a 
form of national pride that many Germans no longer associate with nationalism and right-wing 
extremism” (Sullivan & Dumont, 2014, p. 97). 
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majority of Germans sought to feel some sort of pride in their country elsewhere, for instance in 
“Fußball”. The sport of “Fußball,” like other team sports, is inherently driven by identifying 
strongly with one’s team and competing against others. Both of these mechanisms are shown in 
Wortmann’s films “Das Wunder von Bern”​ ​(2003) and “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” 
(2006). “Das Wunder von Bern”​ ​and the strong, emotional identification in “Fußball” will be 
discussed in-depth first. Then, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen”​ ​will be considered in the 
ways it draws Germans to identify strongly with their “Fußball.” 
Das Wunder von Bern. ​The Wortmann (2003) film, “Das Wunder von Bern,” depicts 
the 1954 World Cup that was held in Switzerland. It is a story about a fictional character who is a 
young boy named Matthias and his fictional family as his father, Richard, comes back from 
being a prisoner of war in Russia during World War II, depicting the real history that was taking 
place during this time. In this movie, Matthias embodies the German youth while his father 
represents the collective guilt Germans faced for their actions in the war. Along with this, 
Matthias’ friend, Helmut Rahn, who was a real-life soccer player but is fictionalized in this film 
through his portrayal by the actor Sascha Göpel, plays “Fußball” for the German National Soccer 
Team. Simultaneously, as Matthias’ father is struggling to re-connect with his family after 
experiencing trauma and spending so many years apart, a reporter, Paul, and his wife, Annette, 
are traveling to Bern to cover the 1954 FIFA World Cup. All three parties of Matthias and his 
father, Helmut Rahn, and the reporter along with his wife end up at the final game between 
Germany and Hungary in Bern, Switzerland to witness the Germans win, which is the titular 
“Wunder” (miracle). 
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To summarize briefly the movie, “Das Wunder von Bern” begins with Matthias and his 
family receiving news that the father will be returning home. There is tension surrounding this 
for the entire family since 11 years had gone by while the father was away at war. For Matthias 
especially, he had never met his father before and already had a strong male figure in his life that 
he considered his role model, Helmut Rahn. Matthias went to all of Rahn’s soccer games, called 
him the “boss” and was even his bag carrier at many games. Numerous events take place that 
increased the tension between Matthias and his father, including his father killing Matthias’ 
beloved pet rabbits to feed the family. Eventually, as Rahn leaves to play in the World Cup, 
Matthias begins to understand his father’s point-of-view more and his father does the same for 
him about Matthias’ love for soccer. At the end of the film, the father borrows a car to drive his 
son and him to see the 1954 World Cup finale in Bern. This act shows Matthias how much his 
father does love him, despite the father’s struggles that are depicted in the movie of finding 
work, ending up working in a mine, and the trauma he endured that continues to fog his mind. 
Looking back on this victory in Bern for the Germans that has been equated to a miracle, 
the film quickly became a major hit in Germany, especially as the “narrative of the 
‘Wirtschaftswunder’​ ​(the industrial miracle of post-war Germany symbolically expressed in the 
1954 World Cup) reappeared in debates” (Daffner, 2011, p. 99). Wortmann touched a nerve in 
German society when he turned this myth into a major motion picture film. Blecking (2015) 
explains how already on the first weekend after the release, “380,000 moviegoers were going to 
see ‘Das Wunder von Bern’​ ​in the theatres and the movie found its place on the box office hits 
list as three million Germans were said to have seen the film” (p. 197, my translation). Its 
popularity can be attributed to the feel-good emotions such as pride, hope, inspiration that arise 
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after watching a movie depicting the country one identifies with as a winner after substantial 
failures (Sullivan & DuMont, 2014).  There are definite elements within “Das Wunder von 13
Bern” that push the German audience to identify strongly and positively with their country. 
These components include the depiction of the German National Soccer Team’s training and an 
infamous quote from a real-life reporter, Herbert Zimmermann, from the finale at Bern who is 
portrayed in the film through a voice recording. 
Arguably, the most important scene in the film shows the fierce passion in the players as 
they play soccer harder than they ever have before in what BILD (a popular German tabloid) 
called the “Battle of Bern” during the final game between Germany and Hungary to earn the title 
of the 1954 FIFA World Cup champion (Schiller, 2015, p. 180). However, the build-up 
throughout the movie to this major event is just as noteworthy in fostering the audience’s feeling 
that this is​ their​ team that ​belongs​ to them. There are aspects of the film that indicate how vital it 
was to the Germans that their team was well-trained. It was as if they were right alongside their 
team playing on the soccer field themselves as they prepped for and competed in the World Cup 
as they watched the team on television and listened in on the radio. For instance, the team’s 
training was also televised and the commentator not only introduced all the players by their name 
and their hometown but also made remarks on their skills (Wortmann, 2003, 0:22:40). For 
example, one included Paul Mebus’s introduction where the narrator paused to say how if all the 
other player’s skills have not yet commanded one’s respect, check out Paul Mebus and his 
“Fußfertigkeit” (footwork) as he is shown dribbling the soccer ball intensely (Wortmann, 2003, 
13 A finding from Sullivan and Dumont’s (2014) study showed that after watching German soccer, there 
was “a significant increase in ‘proud to be German’ scores pre-game to post-game” (p. 101). This is 
relevant as a sense of group pride is being drawn in the movie in a similar fashion that a soccer game 
does. 
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0:23:19). By focusing on their skills such as footwork along with where they are from within 
Germany, a national identity is being forged that includes various local identities. 
Along with television, radio was depicted within the film as a way for the Germans to 
catch up on the team and feel like they were a part of the journey. This also aligns with what was 
happening in real life at the time the movie is set. Both East and West Germans listened in on the 
game in Bern, just as the movie displayed, making it “einen gesamtdeutschen Ereignis im 
geteilten Land” (an all-German event in the divided country) (Blecking, 2015, p. 199). The radio 
was shown as a crucial medium to the team’s training in terms of keeping spectators up-to-date 
on the team’s progress in the film when a turning point happened with the fictional characters of 
Matthias and his father who left for war before he was born. This occurred when Matthias turned 
off the radio soccer announcements to listen to his father instead, which was a big gesture since 
Matthias, like many, was deeply invested in the German National Soccer Team so turning off the 
radio let his father know that he was as important as soccer to him (Wortmann, 2003, 1:10:02). 
Similar to Matthias following the games intensely, reporters also went wild over the 
World Cup, which is depicted in the film. One particular incident, that shows how deep the 
devotion to German soccer is, happened during the intense final game between Germany and 
Hungary. This incident was both depicted in the film and happened in real life. As Toni Turek, 
the German goalkeeper, blocked the goal of Hungary when the game was tied, Herbert 
Zimmermann declared profusely with great emotion that “Turek, du bist ein Teufelskerl! Turek, 
du bist ein Fußball-Gott! (Turek, you are a hotshot! Turek, you are a soccer God!)” (Wortmann, 
2003, 1:35:23). To equate a person to a godly figure displays the true lengths that Germans felt 
about their team. They were to be prayed to, worshipped, and upheld just like a God. Blecking 
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(2015) describes this, stating that “Zimmermanns exalted, performed report with quasi-religious 
zeal, in which he stylized the German goalkeeper Toni Turek as a veritable ‘Fußball-Gott’, 
struck then the heart of an emerging, understood, all-German community” (p. 200, my 
translation). 
The passion behind the World Cup that nears godly devotion is further shown earlier in 
the film when Richard, Matthias’s father, goes to church and asks to speak with the priest. Rather 
than discussing what Richard has on his mind, the priest immediately begins discussing how 
unbelievable it is that the German National Soccer Team is in the world finale with a boy from 
their town shooting the goal (Wortmann, 2003, 1:07:52). Then, to stop the conversation about 
soccer, Richard has to explicitly say that he is not there to chat about “Fußball”. By comparing 
Turek to a type of God and seeing how even priests were devout to German soccer, “Das 
Wunder von Bern” shows the extent of strong identification that was confined in the hearts of 
Germans for their team. 
Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen. ​In parallel to his previous film, “Das Wunder von 
Bern,” Wortmann (2006) released a documentary film on the German National Team in the 2006 
World Cup called “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen.” The film follows the team behind the 
scenes as they prepare to play in the 2006 World Cup and documents their entire journey from 
the first game until their final game for third place against Portugal. The film premiered on 
October 3rd in 2006, which is the Day of German Unity, making it “a spectacle of national 
importance” as Daffner (2011) describes. I believe the premiere on the Day of German Unity 
was intentional to show the significance of the 2006 World Cup as an event with the full 
capability to re-ignite the German pride for their country. This is shown in that October 3, 2006 
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landed on a Tuesday, which is not a typical day to host a film premiere. This premiere had the 
power to get the Germans to identify strongly with Germany again and help “the country to like 
itself again” as Daffner (2011) notes.  
Interestingly, the documentary’s name plays on Heinrich Heine’s 1844 epic poem 
“Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen” with the same reference to fairy tales (“Märchen”) but 
Wortmann’s (2006) is not satire like Heine’s (1915) is.  Wortmann (2006) takes a poem written 14
by a classic poet and changes the title from winter to summer, letting the contrast between his 
work and Heine’s (1915) be known. In “Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen,” Heine (1915) recalls 
his journey across Germany and sneers at aspects of German life, such as in chapter 4 with a 
stanza about the Cologne Cathedral. Heine (1915) writes, “He [The cathedral] should be the 
spirit of Bastille / And the crafty Romans thought: / In this huge dungeon will / The German 
common sense wither!” (my translation). This suggests that the Germans are losing their 
common sense due to religion and that the cathedral will end up the same as the fortress of 
Bastille or as a prison, which is the complete opposite of what Wortmann (2006) wished to make 
his target audience feel. Wortmann (2006) states that despite his reservations and skepticism 
toward the national flag and anthem due to the country’s devastating past, “the World Cup in 
2006 finally confirmed his positive feelings about Germany since the national team embodied 
the ‘perfect image of the new modern Germany,’” which is related to his belief that “the German 
football team is an idealized construct of the imagined German community” (Daffner, 2011, p. 
100). Hence, Wortmann’s (2006) film, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen,” fostered these same 
14 The reference to Märchen in both the epic poem by Heine (1915) and the documentary film by 
Wortmann (2006) further provides evidence on how Germans consider fairy tales as an aspect of their 
national identity. 
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feelings of positive identification toward Germany with not only its premiere date and title but 
also with German public figures such as Angela Merkel being in the film and the specific camera 
shots. 
Besides the famous “Fußball” players participating in the 2006 World Cup themselves, 
the movie had influential, well-known German figures depicted throughout, leading the audience 
to recognize many of the people in the film. This recognition brought Germans closer to the 
center of the event and Ismer et al. (2017) found that the closer the distance between people and 
the center of the event or ritual, “the more powerful and successful in creating emotional energy 
and group attachment the ritual will be” (p. 558). Hence, when Angela Merkel, Germany’s 
chancellor, first appears in the film at the beginning during a press briefing and gives a speech of 
encouragement to the team (Wortmann, 2006, 0:17:38), she not only ignites a fire within the 
team but also the entire country when she uses “we” to speak on the behalf of all of Germany. 
Merkel explains how we (Germany) will do what we can to help the team win (Wortmann, 2006, 
0:18:51). Thus, although Angela Merkel says that politics and football are different things, 
Wortmann (2006) shows the politician in charge of the country in the documentary showing 
support for the team to show the relevance of this event to the country to those who may be 
speculative about its power, which is similar to how a political documentary would want to show 
a football player showing support for a party to appeal to non-typical viewers and encourage 
them to vote. Despite political party lines, even if one disliked Angela Merkel, they see the 
significance in the event as the chancellor is responding to it. It gives the platform a wider range 
of an audience to reach to get them to emotionally invest and identify with the team or political 
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party.  This demonstrates how “Fußball” is of major concern to politics. The concern for 15
“Fußball” due to the intense feelings that it can give is further backed when Angela Merkel 
attends the movie premiere on German Unity Day. 
Along with the portrayal of public figures, the way that “Deutschland. Ein 
Sommermärchen”​ ​is shot as a movie also motivates the audience to identify closely and strongly 
with the German team and nation through the “forbidden places” that Wortmann captured in the 
film that were strictly behind the scenes (Daffner, 2011, p. 103). These forbidden places include 
the bus, the football field, hotel rooms, and locker rooms. These off-limit locations are made 
accessible by Wortmann (2006). In the locker rooms, as shown in screenshot one, Wortmann 
(2006) takes shots from an angle that makes it seem like he should not be in that room (0:48:35). 
Shooting from this angle makes these scenes that much more interesting to viewers since they 
are placed in a position where the suspense and curiosity are increased as they have to guess 
what it would feel like to belong in that room. In one specific scene especially, Wortmann does 
not show the face of Oliver Kahn, the goalkeeper who was benched during the final game against 
Portugal, leaving the “viewer to imagine the intensity of emotions that must be going through 
Kahn’s head” (Daffner, 2011, p. 103). By having to speculate on what Kahn was feeling, the 
viewer is more likely to identify with him and feel excessive passion toward the winning as well 
as Germany. This, coupled with the fact that “we [Germany] are not as rich as other nations in 
terms of national events and symbols which provide a strong collective experience” (Schiller, 
2015, p. 181), made the audience susceptible to these deliberative camera shots by Wortmann 
15 Along with Merkel, the film also has Michael Schumacher, an infamous German Formula 1 racing 
driver, and Xavier Naidoo, a top-hits German singer. Both of these German figures are also used in 
similar ways as Merkel to urge the audience to identify strongly with the German team and nation.  
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(2006) because the 2006 World Cup was made into a collective, national event with profound 
meaning.  
Both films during the early 2000s set out to urge Germans to identify strongly with their 
country and understand the intense meaning behind the 1954 World Cup and 2006 World Cup 
for Germany. In “Das Wunder von Bern,” a deep identification with Germany was fostered in 
the film through the narration of the team’s training that showed how important it was for 
Germans to experience a win after traumatic losses and the devotion to Fußball as shown in the 
comparison of Turek to a ‘Fußball-Gott’ and the deep interest of a priest in the games. Similarly, 
“Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” fostered a strong, emotional identification to Germany by 
utilizing German public figures such as Angela Merkel and capturing footage that feels 
exclusive, leading viewers to interpret the feelings in the scene as their own. Each film had not 
only this ability to elicit excessive feelings of identification but also an us versus them dynamic 
of exclusion, where the concept of nationalism truly thrives as “nationalism is seen as inherently 
related to out-group derogation” (Mummendey et al., 2001, p. 160).  
Us Versus Them Dynamic 
In this subsection, I will consider how both films by Wortmann (2003, 2006) display the 
dynamic of us versus them, which promotes nationalism. Contrary to identification, exclusion is 
also demonstrated within the premise of “Fußball” as the fact that only one team can win the 
game. This creates the dynamic that it is either ​us​ or​ them​ who will leave the field as winners, 
which mirrors nationalism as a mindset that promotes the “derogation of other nations” 
(Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 1). By pitting one nation’s team against another nation’s team, the 
World Cup encourages chants that depreciate the capability the other nation has. Even those who 
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are just watching the game at home will feel a loss due to the strong identification that has made 
this team and their victories belong to them. Ismer et al. (2017) recount George Orwell’s 
commentary of football as “‘war minus the shooting’ that activates the ‘combative instincts of 
both players and audiences’” (p. 554). Thus, when a team such as the German National Soccer 
Team does lose such as during the first game against Hungary in the 1954 World Cup or in the 
semi-finals game against Italy in the 2006 World Cup, these games were considered deep losses 
by a wide array of people, especially since the “spectacle[s] [took] on the form of national 
culture” through the sports films that depicted these events (Daffner, 2011, p. 109). Hence, I next 
analyze “Das Wunder von Bern”​ ​and “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” regarding their us 
versus them dynamic that promotes out-group derogation by emphasizing the victory of the 
in-group.  
Das Wunder von Bern.  ​Fifty years after the “German myth” of the miracle at Bern, 
Wortmann (2003) decided, in his own words, to take the mass medium of film and use it to 
“introduce this ‘German myth’ to Germany’s next generation” (Daffner, 2011, p. 99). His motive 
was to preserve a German myth that the victory for West Germany in Bern put Germany back in 
the global and political upper leagues because one year after the win, the last prisoners of war 
came home and another year later, “das Wirtschaftswunder” (the economic miracle) started 
(Blecking, 2015, p. 203; Wortmann, 2006). The linking of the economic miracle that took place 
and the miracle at Bern in the film and elsewhere created the myth that if West Germany had lost 
against Hungary in the World Cup, the German economy would likely not have recovered as fast 
as it did after the win. This German myth that was reintroduced and reaffirmed in Wortmann’s 
(2003) film, “Das Wunder von Bern,” captures the strong identification Germans have with the 
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1954 World Cup and asserts a large amount of pressure on the significance of the event in 
German history. This increased tension surrounding the outcome of the game is displayed in the 
movie through the dynamic of us versus them. The other nickname for “Das Wunder von Bern” 
was “Den Sieg der Unseren” (The Victory of Us). The film about this victory of “us” (Germany) 
has many notable moments of this dynamic, including the blatant question of “Bist du für uns 
oder bist du gegen uns?” (Are you with us or are you against us?), the actions in the film of the 
fictional reporter, Paul Ackermann who is played by Lucas Gregorowicz, and the speeches the 
real-life German National Soccer Team coach, Sepp Herberger, as portrayed by actor P​é​ter 
Franke, gives the team in the film. 
One particular scene that demonstrates the dynamic of us versus them in “Das Wunder 
von Bern” happens after the devastating loss against Hungary. Rahn was benched most of the 
game and makes the decision of going out to a bar to drink, going against Herberger’s strict 
instructions. Then, Rahn wakes up the next morning to his roommate and captain of the team, 
Fritz Walter, asking him a blatant question (Wortmann, 2003, 0:49:43). Walter asks Rahn, “Bist 
du für uns oder bist du gegen uns?” (Are you for us or are you against us?), showing that there is 
no neutrality. One is either with the team or against the team. By asking Rahn which one he was, 
it displays how Rahn’s decision to go out was making it appear like his position as being for the 
team is unclear. There could be no uncertainty surrounding whether a person, especially a player, 
was for the team representing the nation or not. 
This point is further illustrated through the constant surveillance of the team and their 
activities by real-life reporters such as Paul Ackermann played by Lucas Gregorowicz in the 
film. The film’s display of him wanting to know every action of the team is indicative of how 
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important it was for the nation to feel like the entire team is fully dedicated and equipped to win. 
For instance, when the fictional Paul Ackermann and his wife noticed members of the team in 
the bar they were at, Ackermann remarks that they are definitely going against Herberger’s rules 
and insists on moving closer to hear what the players are saying (Wortmann, 2003, 0:44:02). 
Later, Ackermann and his wife end up dropping Rahn off at the steps of the team’s house and, 
although Ackermann notes what a story it would be, he does not write it so that Herberger does 
not know the events (even though he still finds out about them) (Wortmann, 2003, 0:46:46). The 
reporter was aware of the magnitude that the story could have, both for Rahn’s soccer career and 
the nation. This helps craft the image of national solidarity since if it came across that a player 
was against the team, then it would have been hard for the public to believe in it since the sport 
follows the us versus them dynamic very strictly, which is also shown in the speeches given by 
Herberger. 
Sepp Herberger was the coach of the German National Soccer Team for the 1954 World 
Cup. Ultimately, he led the team to becoming champions, but it was not without several speeches 
to uplift the team and put down the opposing team. For instance, Wortmann (2003) displays the 
us versus them dynamic during a discussion before the final game against Hungary (1:19:52). In 
this talk, Herberger talks about how the Hungarian team does not know them or how strong they 
(Germans) are and the Hungarians do not know that they are strong enough “zu schlagen” (to 
defeat) (Wortmann, 2003, 1:21:50). The phrase “zu schlagen” makes sense in this context as the 
Germans are setting out to win against the other team, but it is also interesting to point out that 
just like in English with the phrase ‘to beat’, “zu schlagen” can also mean ‘to beat’, ‘to hit’, and 
‘to punch’ among other things. This draws back onto what George Orwell recounts about soccer 
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and how it has war-like qualities since although “zu schlagen” in this context means to defeat the 
other team, one wrong translation and it could be suggesting that the other team will be punched 
(Ismer et al., 2017, p. 554). Regardless of the word choice, his speech clearly divides the 
Germans and the Hungarians as he talks about a ‘they’ and a ‘we’ while suggesting that the 
Hungarian team has no idea what they are up against. 
In a similar fashion as the discussion before the final game against Hungary, various 
polarizing sentences are said during half-time of the finals when Germany and Hungary are tied 
two to two. Herberger shouts aggressive phrases like “it stands two to two”, “we could be world 
champions”, “pay attention”, and “fight, fight” (Wortmann, 2003, 1:32:21). During this, the 
camera shots follow exactly where Herberger moves as he looks at every player he passes by in 
the eye and explains further how the Hungarians are angry and they are going to start the second 
half ready to go (Wortmann, 2003, 1:32:36). Herberger discusses the game as if it were a battle 
and he was a general in his passionate shouting of “kampft, kampft!” (fight, fight!) and his deep 
enunciation of “the Hungarians are angry” (Wortmann, 2003, 1:32:35). It comes down to 
whether it will be us (Germany) or them (Hungary) and explicit strategies are discussed and 
made to tire out the Hungarians so that the Germans will win. For instance, Hedigkuli, a 
Hungarian player, is singled out during Herberger’s pre-game discussion and his name is circled 
to emphasize the task Herberger assigned to the German player, Klaus (Wortmann, 2003, 
1:21:15). The weaknesses of the Hungarians, or the out-group, were to be capitalized on, 
fostering an environment where nationalistic tendencies would likely result as one team sees 
themselves as superior over another. 
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Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen. ​Similar displays also appeared in Wortmann’s 
(2006) “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen.”​ ​With the 2006 World Cup being largely considered 
a major “turning point in modern Germany's self-understanding and endorsement of public 
expressions of national pride,” it is important to explore all facets of how nationalism could be 
encouraged through a movie such as “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen”​ ​by Wortmann (2006) 
(Ismer et al., 2017, p. 555). This popular movie that still holds the top spot for “football DVDs” 
on Amazon in Germany and holds a majority of positive reviews, almost five stars (Amazon, 
n.d.), all citing the “magic summer of 2006”​ ​builds a strong identification in viewers to Germany 
by the ways mentioned previously above and through exclusionary tactics (Daffner, 2011, p. 97). 
These us versus them exclusionary strategies against out-groups are shown through coach Jürgen 
Klinsmann’s dialogue to the soccer team about other nations and the slogan of “Für Deutschland 
- durch Deutschland” (For Germany - through Germany). 
During the 2006 World Cup, Klinsmann had become a famous German figure to the 
country. When the documentary premiered on German Unity Day, the familiar face of 
Klinsmann was likely not a surprise to the audience. His advocacy of going against the German 
mentality of standing still by using positive thinking and having the courage to change was also 
likely not a new revelation (Daffner, 2011, p. 101). However, with the film being shot in the 
unique way it was with behind-the-scenes out-of-touch places, these scenes depicted on the big 
screen gave a new perspective on Klinsmann that greatly emphasized the us versus them 
dynamic. For example, during the game against Argentina, Klinsmann urges his team to think 
only on the game from the first second on (Wortmann, 2006, 0:48:48). This sentence appears 
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normal since when a person is playing a sport, they should be focused on the game, but 
Klinsmann goes on further. 
He talks about how “alle Nationen sagen da will keiner mehr gegen Deutschland spielen” 
(All nations say that they do not want to play against Germany anymore), bringing England and 
Sweden into the conversation even when they are playing against Argentina (Wortmann, 2006, 
0:49:25). As a result, Klinsmann introduces more than just the two teams (Germany and 
Argentina) that are playing to suggest that no nation takes them seriously. This game is more 
than just against Argentina; it has become against every nation who doubts Germany. It becomes 
something more than just the World Cup in this moment and this passion is heard in Klinsmann’s 
voice when he says to his team that they must make them zip their lips to take back their words 
(Wortmann, 2006, 0:49:25). It is not a should, but a must, indicating the intensity of the 
statement and showing how one cannot doubt their country at all because if one does, then one is 
for the other nations. This word “for” leads to the next display of exclusionary tactics in the 
documentary, which is the slogan “Für Deutschland -- durch Deutschland” (“For Germany -- 
through Germany). 
Throughout the documentary, Wortmann (2006) captures huge crowds of German fans. 
At the end, enormous swarms of fans are shown in Berlin, Germany’s capital city, as the bus full 
of players drives through the crowd that includes police officers and soldiers (Wortmann, 2006, 
1:55:57). While the scene shows these images, the slogan “Für Deutschland -- durch 
Deutschland” is heard repeatedly. The thought that only Germans are for Germany and it is 
through Germans across all of Germany for Germany that third place was earned in the 2006 
World Cup shows the large possibility of derogation of out-groups taking place. 
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These out-groups may include those living in Germany who have become German 
citizens but do not have stereotypical German features or resemble what many consider to be 
German. Hence, when Germany played Turkey in a Euro 2008 tournament and the large Turkish 
population in Berlin was considered, Sullivan and Dumont (2014) wrote that “the strong 
connection between nationalism and derogation of immigrants would lead us to expect that when 
Germany wins an important game over a country such as Turkey, attitudes toward Turkish 
people in Germany would become less positive” (p. 97). Although it was found that the decrease 
was not significant enough to support this hypothesis, a significant negative correlation was 
discovered “between the positive and negative affect scale (PANAS) pride item and Turkish 
association (TA) and between the post-game team identification item score and TA” (Sullivan & 
Dumont, 2014, p. 104). This means that there is still a relationship, albeit complicated, between 
nationalism and the derogation of immigrants that occurs when Germany plays another nation in 
soccer that has a large population in their country, which is why it is important to understand 
how “Fußball” acts as a post-WWII domain of nationalism in Germany. 
 Both films give a platform to nationalism by fostering an us versus them dynamic that 
can lead to the degoration of outgroups since they are not a part of the superior in-group. “Das 
Wunder von Bern”​ ​and “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen”​ ​each display this exclusionary 
dynamic during speeches made by the soccer coaches. Herberger, as portrayed by actor P​éter 
Franke​ and Klinsmann, played by himself, both say phrases that emphasize the superiority of 
Germany and the lesser nature of the team they are playing against. Klinsmann even brings other 
nations that are not even playing at the time into the conversation such as England and Sweden, 
making the ‘them’ that Germany is against bigger than just one nation. Each film also has other 
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aspects involving language that emphasize the importance of the in-group of the Germans over 
the out-group. Noticing how critical of a role language can play in the development of 
nationalism should be an indicator that as long as a strong, intense identification with a country 
is being encouraged and an us versus them dynamic is being relied upon, the concept needs to be 
discussed to minimize the inherent nationalistic tendencies within the game of “Fußball.” 
Nationalism Today 
Nationalism is still prevalent today; it is not a thing of the past. As many countries 
including Germany keep their borders open to refugees, such as those from the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis, the relationship between the derogation of outgroups and nationalism is especially crucial 
to assess and monitor. Many psychological studies have shown not only the difference between 
patriotism and nationalism but have found various predictors of nationalism that are important to 
note. As described in the literature review, these include firstly, from Schatz et al.’s (1999) study, 
that there is a significant positive predictor of cultural contamination with nationalism in blind 
patriotism as well as a strong correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and blind 
patriotism. Next, Dekker et al. (2003) discovered that national emotions, auto-stereotypes, 
attitude toward outgroups, and national socialization were all strong predictors for a person’s 
national attitude, which can develop into nationalism. To add to this, Takeuchi et al. (2016) 
assessed the brain and found that those with low compassion and higher nationalism show it in 
their brains through greater rGMD in their PCC, displaying psychological characteristics of 
nationalists. Furthermore, nationalism was proven to change over time by Davidov’s (2011) 
study and a Blank and Schmidt (2003) study in Germany supported their hypothesis that as 
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         73 
nationalism increases, there is an increase in the degradation of outgroups as well as 
anti-Semitism.  
Knowing that two domains of post-WWII nationalism include fairy tales and soccer, 
these predictors from the literature review such as national emotions, auto-stereotypes, attitude 
toward outgroups, and national socialization should all be considered heavily as to what role they 
play in fairy tales and soccer for Germany. One should think about how many contemporary 
films continue to show many of the same tropes I discussed largely above such as strong 
emotional identification and the us versus them dynamic. If similar tropes that foster and display 
nationalism are present in many films today, it suggests that socialization through films has 
allowed nationalism to remain a dominant concern for many countries, especially Germany. The 
finding by Blank and Schmidt (2003) that the higher the nationalism scores, the higher the 
degradation of outgroups propounds the idea that having a national cinema is harmful. On the 
other hand though, since higher patriotism is linked to lower degradation of outgroups, the 
findings by Blank and Schmidt (2003) also imply that a patriotic cinema has the ability to have 
different outcomes than a national one.  
Taking into consideration that a patriotic cinema could highlight these same tropes in 
different ways that do not harm others, I believe it is still important that current and future film 
directors are aware of the danger within these tropes when they utilize them. Believing one’s 
country is superior to all others is not patriotism and this shows in the gray matter in a person’s 
brain (Takeuchi et al., 2016). Film directors should be encouraged to use their film medium to 
show a different perspective to the us versus them dynamic that creates negative attitudes toward 
outgroups. Perhaps, a soccer film could be made that shows both views of the players and fans. 
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         74 
Seeing the connection between current psychological research on nationalism and Germany’s 
post-WWII history with nationalism can aid the country well in the future by showing Germans 
that although it may seem like their country has struggled more than others, they do not need to 
prove their superiority or degrade other nations to show their German pride.   
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         75 
References 
Amazon (n.d.). ​Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen. ​Amazon.de. Retrieved February 22, 2021, 
from ​https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-Ein-Sommerm  
Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (2003). National identity in a united Germany: Nationalism or 
patriotism? An empirical test with representative data. ​Political Psychology, 24​(2), 
289-312. doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00329 
Blecking, D. (2015). Das „wunder von bern” 1954 - Zur politischen instrumentalisierung eines 
mythos. ​Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, 40​(4), 197-208. doi: 
10.12759/hsr.40.2015.4.197-208  
Blessing, B. (2010). Happily socialist ever after? East German children’s films and the education 
of a fairy tale land. ​Oxford Review of Education, 36​(2), 233-248. doi: 
10.1080/03054981003696747 
Brueilly, J. (1990). Nation and nationalism in modern German history. ​The Historical Journal, 
33​(3), 659-675.  
Daffner, C. (2011). Football, mythology and identity in Sönke Wortmann’s ​deutschland. Ein 
sommermärchen​. ​Austausch, 1​(1), 95-115. 
Davidov, E. (2011). Nationalism and constructive patriotism: A longitudinal test of 
comparability in 22 countries with the ISSP. ​International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research, 23​(1), 88-103. doi: 10.1093/ijpor/edq031 
DEFA (Producer), & Engel, C. (Director). (1960). ​Das zaubermännchen ​[Motion Picture]. East 
Germany: DEFA. 
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         76 
DEFA (Producer), & Simon, R. (Director). (1969). ​Wie heiratet man einen könig ​[Motion 
Picture]. East Germany: DEFA. 
Dekker, H., Malov​á, D., & Hoogendoorn, S. (2003). Nationalism and its explanations. ​Political 
Psychology, 24​(2), 349-376. ​doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00331 
Dempsey, J. (2004). ​German fears grow that far-right party will return to national stage.​ New 
York Times. Retrieved February 23, 2021, from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/international/europe/german-fears-grow-that-farrig
ht-party-will-return-to.html  
Ehrlich, K. (Producer), & Marischka, E. (Director). (1955). ​Sissi ​[Motion Picture]. West 
Germany: Erma-Film. 
Ervedosa, C. (2020). ‘Elective affinities’: Interdiscursive dynamics between football, the 
economy, and nationalism in Germany. ​National Identities, 22​(1), 41-62. doi: 
10.1080/14608944.2018.1530647 
Fulbrook, M. (2015). ​A history of Germany 1918-2014: The divided nation ​(4th ed.). John Wiley 
& Sons, Ltd.  
Goritsas, H. (2017). The politics of magic: DEFA fairy-tale films. ​New Review of Film and 
Television Studies, 15​(1), 121-123. doi: 10.1080/17400309.2016.1153860  
Grimm J., & Grimm W. (2001a). ​Kinder und hausmärchen: Die kluge bauerntochter. ​Projekt 
Gutenberg. Retrieved October 7, 2020, from 
https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/grimm/khmaerch/chap096.html​.  
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         77 
Grimm J., & Grimm W. (2001b). ​Kinder und hausmärchen: Rumpelstiltskin. ​Projekt Gutenberg. 
Retrieved October 7, 2020, from 
https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/grimm/khmaerch/chap057.html​. 
Grimm J., & Grimm W. (2019). ​Household tales: The peasant’s wise daughter. ​Project 
Gutenberg. Retrieved October 7, 2020, from 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5314/5314-h/5314-h.htm#chap94  
Haase, D. (1993). Yours, mine, or ours? Perrault, the brothers Grimm, and the ownership of fairy 
tales. ​Merveilles & contes, 7​(2), 383-402.  
Harshbarger, S. (2013). Grimm and grimmer: “Hansel and Gretel” and fairy tale nationalism. 
Style​, ​47​(4), 490-508. 
Heine, H. (1915). ​Deutschland, ein wintermärchen; Faksimiledruck nach der handschrift des 
dichters nebst vier blättern des brouillons aus dem nachlasse der Kaiserin Elisabeth von 
Österreich. Mit einem vorworte herausgegeben von Professor Dr. Friedrich Hirth . F. 
Lehmann, 1915. 
Human Rights Watch. (2021). ​World report 2021: Germany. ​Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 
February 27, 2021 from 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/germany​.  
Huth, H., Spiess, T. (Producers), & Wortmann, S. (Director). (2003). ​Das wunder von Bern 
[Motion Picture]. Germany: Little Shark Entertainment & Seven Pictures Film. 
International Rescue Committee. (n.d.). ​Refugee crisis crisis watch​. International Rescue 
Committee. Retrieved December 23, 2020, from 
https://www.rescue.org/topic/refugee-crisis​.  
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         78 
Ismer, S., Beyer, M., Solms-Baruth, C., & von Scheve, C. (2017). International football 
tournaments, emotional entrainment and the reproduction of symbolic boundaries. A case 
study in Germany. ​Soccer & Society, 18​(4), 554-574. doi: 
10.1080/14660970.2015.1067784  
Mummendey, A., Klink, A., & Brown, R. (2001). Nationalism and patriotism: National 
identification and out-group rejection. ​British Journal of Social Psychology, 40, ​159-172. 
doi: 10.1348/014466601164740 
NCES. (2020). ​Most popular sports in Germany according to the interest of the population from 
2018 to 2020. ​In Statista - The Statistics Portal. Retrieved January 5th, 2020, from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/975658/most-popular-sports-in-germany/​. 
Norweigan Refugee Council. (2020). ​These 10 countries receive the most refugees. ​Norweigan 
Refugee Council. Retrieved December 23, 2020, from 
https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2020/the-10-countries-that-receive-the-most-refugees/​.  
Schatz, R., Staub, E., Lavine, H. (1999). On the varieties of national attachment: Blind versus 
constructive patriotism. ​Political Psychology, 20​(1), 151-174. doi: 
10.1111/0162-895X.00140  
Schiller, K. (2015). “Siegen für deutschland?” patriotism, nationalism and the german national 
football team, 1954-2014. ​Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, 40​(4), 
176-196. doi: 10.12759/hsr.40.2015.4.176-196  
Shen, Q. (2011). Barometers of GDR cultural politics: Contextualizing the DEFA Grimm 
adaptations. ​Marvels & Tales: Journal of Fairy-Tale Studies, 25​(1), 70-95. 
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         79 
Silberman, M. (2006). Learning from the enemy: DEFA-French co-productions of the 1950s. 
Film History, 16, ​21-45. 
Skopal, P. (2018). The pragmatic alliance of DEFA and Barrandov: Cultural transfer, popular 
cinema, and Czechoslovak-East German co-productions 1957-85. ​Historical Journal of 
Film, Radio, and Television, 38​(1), 133-146. doi: 10.1080/01439685.2017.1285151  
Snyder, L. L. (1978). Cultural nationalism: The Grimm brothers’ fairy tales. In Suzanne 
Dewsbury (Eds.), ​Nineteenth-Century Literature Criticism. ​(pp. 35-54). Detroit, MI: Gale 
Group.  
Sullivan, G. B. (2014). Collective emotions, German national pride and the 2006 world cup. In 
Grant Brent Sullivan (Eds.), ​Understanding Collective Pride and Group Identity. ​(pp. 
124-136). New York: Routledge. 
Sullivan, G.B., & Dumont, K. (2014). Collective pride and prejudice: A naturalistic study of the 
effects of group pride versus individual pride on attitudes to migrants following a 
national team victory. In Grant Brent Sullivan (Eds.), ​Understanding Collective Pride 
and Group Identity. ​(pp. 95-109). New York: Routledge. 
Takeuchi, H., Taki, Y., Sekiguchi, A., Nouchi, R., Kotozaki, Y., Nakagawa, S., . . . Kawashima, 
R. (2016). Differences in gray matter structure correlated to nationalism and patriotism. 
Scientific Reports, 6, ​1-10. doi: 10.1038/srep29912  
Wicke, P. (1985). Sentimentality and high pathos: Popular music in fascist Germany. ​Popular 
Music​, ​5​, 149-158.  
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         80 
Wortmann, S., Spiess, T., Hadding, H., Kremin, M., & Feikes, S. (Producers), & Wortmann, S. 
(Director). (2006). ​Deutschland. Ein sommermärchen ​[Motion Picture]. Germany: Little 
Shark Entertainment & WDR Westdeutscher Rundfunk. 
Wortmann, S., Spiess, T., Schieder, T., Huth, H., Remirez, A., Herrmann, B., & Gärtner, S. 
(Producers), & Wortmann, S. (Director). (2003). ​Das wunder von bern ​[Motion Picture]. 
Germany: Little Shark Entertainment, Senator Film Production, & SevenPictures Film. 
  
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         81 
Screenshot Caption 
Screenshot 1. ​Wortmann, S., Spiess, T., Hadding, H., Kremin, M., & Feikes, S. (Producers), & 
Wortmann, S. (Director). (2006). ​Deutschland. Ein sommermärchen ​[Screenshot by 
Youtube]. Germany: Little Shark Entertainment & WDR Westdeutscher Rundfunk. 
  
 
TWO POST-WWII DOMAINS OF NATIONALISM IN GERMANY         82 
 
 
 
